

**PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR
ON TERROR:
INCITING MUSLIMS
THROUGH THE WAR OF IDEAS**

Sherifa Zuhur

April 2008

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

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FOREWORD

The ideology of violent extremists has been discussed frequently since the tragic events of September 11, 2001 (9/11). It is clear that an ideology of Islamist or Islamic political opposition and radicalism has been key to understanding various events and movements that go back even further, to the Islamic Revolution in Iran, for example.

Some policy analysts and public figures have challenged Muslims to change or reform aspects of their beliefs based on the aspects identified as “extremist.” However, there are many interpretations and misinterpretations of what those elements are, and how Muslims should go about reforming their faith. Just as controversial is the idea that there is a “war within Islam” and that the United States should be promoting one army in that war — ideological moderates — so they will defeat their foes.

The author of this monograph, Dr. Sherifa Zuhur, takes issue with some of these assumptions, views, and attacks on basic precepts. She identifies a trend of pathologizing beliefs and practices that are at the core of Islam. That pathologizing impulse may be beneficial in rallying Americans to the defense of their nation, but it might impede the international cooperation necessary to that endeavor. She also aims to educate the reader about the value inherent in particular concepts that may well be unpopular or two-edged, but are part of the historical legacy of Muslims.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to the national security debate over this timely and important subject.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr." in a cursive script.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

SHERIFA ZUHUR is Research Professor of Islamic and Regional Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. She has lectured internationally, has been the recipient of a Fulbright Senior Scholar Regional Research award, and has been a faculty member at various universities including the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the University of California, Berkeley, and The American University in Cairo. One of her research areas is the ideology and development of contemporary Islamist movements. She has published 15 books and monographs and more than 103 articles and chapters in edited books. Her most recent government monograph was *Egypt: Security, Islamist and Political Challenges*. She holds a B.A. in Political Science and Arabic Language and Literature, an M.A. in Islamic Studies, and a Ph.D. in Middle Eastern History, all from the University of California, Los Angeles.

SUMMARY

This monograph questions the messages conveyed to Muslims about their religion and extremism in the war of ideas. Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan since some polling suggests bin Ladin's approval in Jordan suffered a great deal after the hotel bombings?

A reason that the United States is winning so few "hearts and minds" in the broader Islamic world is confusion and imprecision in American strategic messages. The grand strategy of defining, isolating, and destroying Islamism or radical Islamism may not be possible if America does not proceed more carefully, and listen to what its allies think, know, and feel about their faith.

This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the War on Terror and discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in this endeavor.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR: INCITING MUSLIMS THROUGH THE WAR OF IDEAS

INTRODUCTION

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa'ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa'ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.¹ Al-Qa'ida's emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states:

Thanks largely to Washington's eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda's leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.²

It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?

Moving to the tools of "soft power," what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few "hearts and minds" in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite

broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders,³ has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?⁴

This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in this endeavor.

Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; and (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

PATHOLOGIZING

Foremost is a trend in which Islam and by extension, all Muslims, and all versions of contemporary Islamism have been pathologized. Islamist is a term adapted from the French, *Islamist*, which has been used (incorrectly) interchangeably with fundamentalist (*usuliyyun* or *islamiyyun*, in Arabic). Islamists are in reality **those who**

seek to revive, revitalize, and/or reform Islam, Islamic society and/or its governance. Others have earlier defined Islamism (outside of Iran) as a means of linking religion and politics by resisting, instead of legitimizing government⁵ and this version constituted “political Islam,” or its project was traced back to reformers in the nineteenth century “who began to redefine Islam as the ideology that is the basis of the Islamic state.”⁶ However, Islamist activism in the 20th century was not only political, but also social, educational, and charitable. Islamism then includes groups as varied as Wahhabists, salafists, the founders and followers of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, al-Qa’ida, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, the Wasatiyun, Hizbullah, the Justice and Development Party led by Prime Minister Recip Erdogan of Turkey, the *Parti de la Justice et du Développement* (PJD) in Morocco and many other groups such as the Tablighi Jama`at of Pakistan. An enormous number of individuals not specifically linked to any political party of endeavor, approve of Islamist principles today. Moreover, “Islamist” is a word that holds meaning solely in the West.

When all types of Islamists are treated as “militant fundamentalists,” distinct aspects of Islamic thought or institutions are directly linked with terrorism, or very negatively portrayed, while other key principles are dismissed, ignored, or misunderstood. Many of these principles, ideas, and beliefs are not a proper target of Western antipathy. More importantly, they are not the appropriate focus of policymakers who lack the means and vision to reshape the Muslim world and Muslim consciousness as has been proposed in ever so many recommendations about defeating extremism.⁷ Strategic communications (proposed or ongoing) that focus on the reformation of Islam are frequently understood by Muslims as anti-Muslim propaganda,

or at the very least, unconvincing, but vigorously marketed slogans and sound bites.

AREA EXPERTS VS. STRATEGIC EXPERTS?

While this monograph cannot explicate all of the muddled thinking exhibited in the discussions on the GWOT, or the “Long War,” one must register some consternation that area specialists and Islamicists (those who study Islam, as opposed to Islamists, see below) who do not hold to classic or new Orientalist approaches have had limited opportunities to suggest or shape policies toward Islam and the Islamic world in post-9/11 America. That is not to say that certain Muslims and ex-Muslims (who may not be subject matter experts) or authorities on the Muslim world have not been consulted, advised, or served as spokespersons for U.S. governmental policies.

Conflicts with other types of experts arise when Islamicists point out that Islam is not monolithic, that Muslims cannot, for instance, share a common approach to democracy on the basis of their religion. Even more conflict arises when experts explain that Islamist movements are here to stay and when country experts mention inconvenient facts. Our “arcane” and “obscure” knowledge—key details about mosques, neighborhoods, and political organizations, even those in Baghdad⁸—is so needlessly detailed! Many government sources instead rely on summaries from sanitized media reports, which all too often generalize about the Muslim world. In addition, the defense and policy communities sometimes believe themselves to be superior in theorizing and providing analysis as compared to academic experts who, they say, see the trees but not the forest. It can be true that a novice or

outside view can be considered more objective as in the long-standing emic/etic (insider/outsider or local vs. scientific knowledge) debate popularized by linguist Kenneth L. Pike and anthropologist Marvin Harris. Yet, sometimes the outsider conceives a forest out of the trees which is a mirage.

All of this takes place within a fairly unproductive battle of disciplines and canons about what type of expert is best placed and prepared to plan for conflicts, nation-building, counter- and antiterrorism. In the end, both security experts and regional experts advising on the war of ideas are actually subject to the dictates of political actors.

ISLAM AS THE ENEMY?

An excellent preface to American strategic communications on the GWOT are frequent statements that “Muslims are not our enemy.” These have featured in many of President George W. Bush’s addresses⁹ or in media coverage of Islamist violence or militance. Unfortunately, the very next statement often denies key faith concepts of our “enemies,” as in “we [the United States] honor the traditions of Islam. . . . Our enemy does not. Our enemy doesn’t follow the great traditions of Islam.”¹⁰ The President is attempting to describe the radicals as bad Muslims, or “evil,” but many Muslims see the “enemies” literally as “extremists” or co-religionists who do honor the traditions of Islam, but unfortunately to an extreme.

Initial disclaimers that Islam is the enemy may precede references to the Caliphate, an idealized historical form of rule for all Muslims, as in President Bush’s comments that:

They (the terrorists) hope to establish a violent political utopia across the Middle East, which they call a "Caliphate" — where all would be ruled according to their hateful ideology. Osama bin Laden has called the 9/11 attacks — in his words — "a great step towards the unity of Muslims and establishing the Righteous . . . [Caliphate]." This Caliphate would be a totalitarian Islamic empire encompassing all current and former Muslim lands, stretching from Europe to North Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.¹¹

This statement correctly quotes bin Laden, but primarily informs Americans that the "Caliphate" is an evil goal of extremists, and does not mention the historical role of the Caliphate in Muslim history, *weltanschauung*, or *imaginaire*. If President Bush wants to reassure Muslims that they are not the enemy and they are not totalitarians, it would be better to attack the alleged totalitarianism of bin Laden's promised state, rather than imply that its form (as Caliphate) would necessarily be totalitarian.

Our media analysis of actual attacks may begin by excusing ordinary Muslims, but immediately describe radicals as those "who are loyal to the *ummah*,"¹² the name for the Muslim community. Muslims then understand that the initial disclaimer that Islam "is a great world religion, and Muslims are U.S. allies in the GWOT" — is just rhetoric. They cannot help reacting this way when they hear condemnations of "bad" Muslims who are totalitarians, or Islamofascists who believe in the Caliphate, the *ummah*, or the principles of *jihad* or *tawhid* (the concept of oneness, or strict monotheism).

When it comes to Iran, and the Iraqi Shi'a, we hear statements about fanatic millenarianism, defined as belief in the Twelfth Imam, the Imam Mahdi (the messianic figure who will appear before the Day of Judgment), which impart wrongly sinister, or uncompromising ideas to the population. Belief in

the Day of Judgment and the Mahdi are core concepts to all Muslims, although only certain Muslims are attracted to the current that prepares for the return of the Twelfth Imam, as in frequent references made by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran.

TAKFIR AMERICAN-STYLE

Similarly, a particular version of jihadist ideology has become quite well-known. We have been calling this “global jihad” as if by doing so, we have made a strategic discovery that can protect us from future attacks. All we need to do is separate the radical from the quotidian.

When Muslim movements display a puritanically radical interpretation, as with the Taliban, it seems perfectly logical to differentiate between the warped, or perverted use of such concepts and what they mean to other Muslims. In the explanatory attempt to separate ordinary, mainstream Muslims from “The Enemy,” many Western (and some Muslim) analysts engage in a misleading binarism, which mirrors the *takfir* methodology of the radical Islamists, when they declare illicit rulers or others “to be *kuffar* (infidels).” Just so, many policy analysts try to neatly differentiate radical Islamists from all other Muslims, ineptly throwing “good concepts” (like the *ummah*, the Caliphate, or *tawhid*) in with the “bad.” Doing so identifies a much larger number of Muslims as potential enemies of the West.

A simplistic description of “militant Islamists” fails to provide very convincing reasons for “militant ideology,” and the wide diversity of causes within the region is glossed over. Instead, the only point of agreement (and even this may wane) is that militancy will continue so long as the regional environment is

not democratic, and thus it is really a failure of political development within the Muslim world.¹³ What alarms Muslims is the proposal that it is the United States that will overcome the ideology of militant or radical Islam, and forcibly make changes on the ground in the Muslim world whether by military action or through U.S.-directed democratization. Various strategic communications appear to be launching or advancing these campaigns willy-nilly, no matter how Muslims react or respond.

DEFINING THE ENEMY

Reading more carefully, it seems that terminology which has developed since the Reagan era continues to confuse matters. “Fundamentalists” was a term largely rejected by the academic community, especially Middle Eastern specialists¹⁴ who instead gradually adopted a French term, *Islamist* (to be differentiated from Islamicist, one who studies Islam). That community acknowledged a wide range of Islamists, or Islamisms, but some policymakers still revert to their own conception of fundamentalists—people who embrace a medieval Islam. Despite the large numbers of Islamist technocrats and professionals who have little in common with medieval thinkers, the term persists. To complicate matters, “militant Islamists” are in turn confused with “political Islam” and, since 9/11, with global jihad.

“Militant Islamists” comprise a very lengthy enemy list and excludes those Islamists (or fundamentalists, or conservatives, or mainstream Muslims) who have little interest in taking over their countries, or indeed, the world. Clearly, many Islamists are not part of political Islam, but some are. But the former are overlooked in

the effort to create a new Terror, and great fear of a “global insurgency” or a global jihad, rather than just any jihad, or intermittent militant opposition.

Along these lines we read,

Conceptualizing militant Islam not just as a rogue ideology but also as part of a global insurgency would facilitate the war effort. Successful action requires U.S. officials to acknowledge militant Islam as the core of the problem. Failure to do so not only hampers efforts to address the Islamist insurgency’s center of gravity and develop strategic communications but, ironically—in the name of political correctness and tolerance—it also betrays Muslims who are among the first victims of militant Islam.¹⁵

I have tried, along with other experts, to point out that the so-called “global insurgency,” is not singular, has no sole center of gravity, and advised narrowing the field of enemies to those “militant” Islamists who are also violent and coercive, not those who pose no reasonable threat to the United States. It is not in the name of political correctness and tolerance that we should be aware of the overlap between potentially violent radicals and nonthreatening figures, it is because the effort to pursue “militant Islam” instead of simply opposing “terrorism,” is too grand a project—one that points at all those who oppose U.S. policies, and even some of our allies who do not.

THEOLOGOCENTRISM, IDEOLOGY, AND ESSENTIALIZING.

George Lichtheim wrote about ideology:

From the vulgar misunderstanding inherent in the familiar statement 'We need a better ideology to fight the enemy' to the refinements of academic dispute over

the 'ideology of science,' one encounters a terminological vagueness which appears to reflect deep uncertainty over the status of ideas in the genesis of historical movements.¹⁶

Lichtheim explains that the first ideologues and the inventor of the term “ideology” were learned men of the Institut de France in revolutionary France in 1795. In some ways, the confusion between religious ideas, Hegelian, and other forms of ideology has fused with the long-standing ignorance of Muslims and their beliefs found in the United States, its political circles, and its own *savants* and *idéalogues*. Those who really do need some guidance in an understanding of Muslim society often blame cultural, religious, or intellectual principles that interest them, and may exaggerate some ideas while missing others not well-explained in English language sources. As is clear in the Christian fundamentalist movement and in customs emanating from Christian tradition, a parallel focus on religion can and does take place outside of Islam—but Christians are not told to separate themselves from the “wrong” type of Christianity as an antidote to terrorism. At the same time, any corrective (such as this monograph) falls right into a different trap—theologocentrism—attributing “all observable phenomena among Muslims to matters of Islamic theology.”¹⁷ As As`ad AbuKhalil, an unabashedly secular Lebanese-American thinker, points out, theologocentrism is both a Western and a Muslim device; groups like the Muslim Brotherhood as well as Arab governments rely on religious symbols and slogans. But the type of overemphasis on Islam in the West is, he points out, founded on Islamophobia. Ali S. Asani noted this dynamic during the first Gulf War, which he felt:

had nothing to do with Islam, absolutely nothing. It was not caused by religion. It was power politics. Yet everybody perceived it to be somehow related to the religion. . . . Not only is that a very naïve way of analyzing society, in a way it's also very denigrating. It implies that Muslims are not like other human beings. The only thing that makes them tick is their religion. They are not influenced by politics or economics or sociological factors, nothing.¹⁸

I have nevertheless focused on concepts and issues related to Islam in this monograph. A more detailed analysis of many of the concepts here introduced would show their evolution to be a result of material conditions and events in real time.

ISLAMOFASCISM

With a distinctive and continuing lack of precision, debates that generally affect Muslims or values that appeal to them are wrongly identified as emanating from “extremism.” Many who speak of “Islamofascism” are guilty of this lack of precision; and they discount or mock Muslim distress over this term. While the use of “fascism” delivers the negative message intended, berating Muslims for fascistic tendencies of their basic beliefs is both untrue and deeply insulting. Those media spokespersons most often vilifying terrorists with the label “Islamofascist” often go on to identify this phenomenon with those who wish to follow *shari`ah* (Islamic law) and live within a Caliphate, as if these two very important Islamic institutions are proof of poisonous terror and fascism. The overwhelming majority of Muslims would disagree with this vilification of their holy law and historic form of government, even if those Muslims reside in republics which utilize civil

legal codes, or argue about the definitions of Islamic law and its jurisprudence, or have no particular desire to see a Caliph rule Muslims.

It is true that some Muslims do not wish to live in a state governed by *shari`ah*, whereas others who live in countries now applying *shari`ah* may not approve of strict externally-imposed measures to maintain piety, or they may fully approve. Others would welcome all economic, social, and political features of the West to dominate the Muslim world, and these have become spokespersons for the theme in the war of ideas that aims to make Muslims “less Muslim,” or “more secular.”

The discourse about secularization and assimilation has been developed in the West, where Muslims live in distinctly Christian societies with secular forms of politics. Naturally, there are parallels to the types of compromises citizens already make within states with Muslim majorities. But there are also differences which indicate the strongest points of tensions in each type of system. For instance, several writers whose previous specialization on Arab nationalism has been succeeded with work on “Muslim fundamentalism” present the secularist worldview of the old-style Arab nationalist. (See **E is for Europe** and **S is for Secularism**) Another has long called Muslim “fundamentalists” fascists. An alliance between these voices and those promoting the clash of civilizations, just like the on-again/off-again alliance between Arab and Muslim democrats and neo-conservatives has dominated much of the attention given to Islam in the post-9/11 period. It would be a gross understatement to say that the secularizers have no great appeal in the Muslim world; indeed, they cause anxiety and distance their audience as soon as “secularism” is mentioned.

Muslims disagree about religiosity, cultural difference, discrimination and the best path toward improving their status in Europe, the United States, and other Western nations. Their views are sensitive to political, national, socioeconomic, and ideological differences amongst Muslims, as well as to disparate national responses toward cultural and religious issues. However, the Muslim world has long resisted colonization and its secondary manifestations, so the needs and strategies of Muslims in diaspora are not identical to those in the region.

ISLAMISM

That brings us to another reason for the deep flaws in the war of ideas – the misdefinition of Islamism. (See pp.2-3) Both goals and methodologies of these Muslims are misinterpreted. For instance, one expert writes, “Islamism is a totalitarian ideology that seeks to use Islam as a vehicle to power. Its doctrine is a contrived mélange of fascist notions of racial superiority, Marxist techniques of human conditioning, and capitalistic entrepreneurship.”¹⁹ The words “fascist” and “totalitarian” resonate with Westerners, especially those who are unable to discern differences between Muslims – Iranians (whose government is Islamist), Saudi Arabians (whose government self-defines as simply “Muslim,” and where citizens are roughly divided 70/30 to 60/40 between Islamists and non-Islamists), and Egyptians (whose government is decidedly anti-Islamist, but the majority of the population are Islamist, though not necessarily interested in political power). It is essential for Americans to realize that some Islamists aim for political power, while others do not. In today’s Muslim world, Islamism is so widespread and popular that many parties and groups use Muslim unity and

principles and the goal of a more Islamic society as part of their platforms. And many Muslims living in the West, who want to retain a modicum of their own culture, are accused of being salafists (purist Islamists) if they do not meet certain criteria. It is impractical today, after so many decades of the Islamic awakening (the *sahwa*, in which Islamists groups have become a majority in many Middle Eastern and Muslim countries) for the West to call for a return to secularism and nationalism, or the “private Islam” advocated decades ago.

What is necessary is to forge an antidote to radical violence by various types of Muslims, and a forum for free and open debate among them. Otherwise, a Western-backed totalitarianism will prevail in which the West’s version of “good Muslims” will exclusively be promoted, and large numbers of Muslims will continue resenting a hypocritical war on terror, or consider it a war on Islam.

PARALLELISM

When the clash between Islam and Christianity, Judaism, or Western political actors is directly discussed—we see many further distortions on both sides. My concern here is the Western assertion that it can—through funding, the media, warfare, or sheer will—rewrite Muslim discourse. For instance, Westerners assume that the clergy play exactly the same role in the Muslim world as they do in Christianity, and zero in on their sermons and the use of words like “Crusaders” for Christians. However, it is extraordinarily difficult to reverse or alter attitudes that fund this popular discourse, and intensely so when corrective measures are perceived to be externally directed.

“SELLING” THE WAR OF IDEAS

Further, even when the discussions about “the Enemy” accurately reflect jihadists activities, similarities between jihadi thought and strategies are overdrawn. A Madison Avenue approach to marketing is producing strategic messages that build on this broad brushing, which will not have the desired effect in the Middle East. These trends are very much the consequence of the reductionism of a marketing approach as articulated by those whose unfamiliarity with Islamic and Middle Eastern cultures coincides with their recent familiarity with global jihadism. Yet without the benefit of a thorough introduction to contextualized and varied permutations of Islamic concepts, values, or traditions, these nonspecialists are under great pressure to make useful suggestions, convincing “pitches,” and attractive sound bites. In general, the brevity and summary required by today’s policy crafters negate subtlety and nuance. As analysts struggle to provide brief definitions of Muslim movements, and quick and easy prescriptions for them, stereotypes and misunderstandings multiply.

SALAFISM

A key target of the war of ideas, salafism, is tough to define. It is not included in the list of misunderstood concepts or misconstrued strategic messages below (however, Wahhabism, one variant, is addressed) because it is now widely used in policy circles. However, policymakers can no more undo salafism than Islamism.

Salafism is an original and underlying facet of jihadism. It is correct to see it as purist reform (the

literal translation of *salafi* would be the “way of the pious ancestors”) and is not necessarily negative. One should be aware of at least three *salafi* groups and philosophies: (1) reformers of the 19th century, including jurist Muhammad `Abduh, Qasim Amin, and Rashid Rida, or the Qasimis of Syria; (2) the “Wahhabists” of the Arabian peninsula; and; (3) the neo-salafis of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. When translating salafism as “Islamic reform,” government sources should understand that the trend goes beyond a few commonly-mentioned individual figures, some of whom held opposing views, and who are by no means the sole exemplars of Islamic reform. For instance, Muhammad Abduh, who critiqued blind imitation of Islamic praxis (*taqlid*) and called for the renovation of Islam (*tajdid*), proposed different issues for reform than some of his followers; or figures like Sayyid Qutb, who was imprisoned and executed in Nasir’s Egypt; or Juhayman al-`Utaybi, who took over the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979 and held hostages there. One could say that Mahmud Shaltut, a Shaykh al-Azhar who defended certain reforms of the Egyptian government in 1960s, is an intellectual descendent of Muhammad Abduh. But he does not really belong in the *salafi* camp of al-`Utaybi or Bin Ladin. In fact, today’s *salafi* or neo-*salafi* Islamists dislike Abduh, and critique him for embracing Western modernism, and may castigate Shaltut. Yet these figures are mentioned in policy papers on Islamic reform with little detail as the point is to quickly summarize the intellectual heritage of today’s radicals and respond to the Western-framed question, “Why have Muslims failed to produce a reformation?”²⁰ The question itself presumes a necessary symmetry in the experience of Christians and Muslims that is unhelpful.

STRATEGIC MESSAGES ABOUT VIOLENT MUSLIMS

Problems in strategic responses to “radicalism” are myriad, sometimes comical, and often divisive. For instance, in Lebanon, an advertising campaign sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and designed by the Saatchi and Saatchi company featured “I Love Life” billboards that appeared throughout Lebanon. This campaign addresses martyrology and suggests that Hizbullah, or extremists like al-Qa’ida, promote martyrdom and death, whereas the “true” Lebanese “Love Life.”²¹ One of the underlying problems with such a campaign is that it is too broad, and can be (and is) read as an attack on all Muslims, or, in the Lebanese context, the entire Lebanese Shi’a community. In politically fragile Lebanon, split between the March 14th and March 8th contingents as well as the broader divisions between sects, the message comes across as that Christians love life, but not Muslims; or the right type of Christians (March 14th and not followers of General Michel Aoun) as well as Sunni Muslims love life, but the Shi’a love death.

This campaign is similar to an Israeli campaign that featured a picture of a little Arab (presumably Palestinian) boy in a suicide vest that reads “I know what I want to be when I grow up.” At the bottom of the poster are the colors of the Israeli flag. These posters were plastered all over a public area in Washington, DC, in June 2007 to protest the annual meeting of the National Association of Arab Americans, and organizers were told they could not be removed due to concerns over First Amendment rights. Muslim or Arab “infection” of their youth is a vicious and pernicious

theme, recently repeated at the close of the film set in Saudi Arabia, *The Kingdom*.

BLURRING

Lack of precision has certainly complicated approaches to the soft war aspects of GWOT, which has also acquired the label the “Long War,” although U.S. Central Command was recently not permitting the use of this term. Within it, the war of ideas is a part of an antiterrorism program to fend off violent radical Islamism, and part of American political strategy. Lack of precision, however, is not the only reason for expert discord about the pursuit of a broader or narrower group of enemies—chiefly pursuing al-Qa’ida and its close affiliates, or these groups along with all other forms of Islamist and salafist groups, and their ideology.

Another reason for illogical approaches to Muslims stems from the bundling of varied “enemies” together. It is impractical to define “the Enemy” as so many varied types of groups—ranging from small groups of dissidents concerned with a particular cause and location to states like Iran to those labeled “global jihadists” (like al-Qa’ida) to movements that encompass educational and social agendaes as well as political programs and which do not necessarily engage in violence. Showing photographs of Hamas leader Ismail Haniya and Iranian President Ahmadinejad together²² does not diminish the essential differences between a state power and that of a movement fighting for territory and the deficits of pursuing common strategies against these disparate entities. The message is clear—Muslim opposition groups and elected Muslim leaders are part of “global jihad.” Yet, these particular leaders and

groups are very much focused on their local interests, have not attacked Americans on U.S. soil, and are not the same type of threat as al-Qa'ida.

Daniel Benjamin has distinguished between three types of terrorism: (1) ethno-nationalist; (2) state-based; and (3) Islamist/jihadist. He pointed out that state terrorism—not restricted to Muslim nations—seems to be on the wane. The absence of the Taliban, removal of Saddam Husayn's regime in Iraq, the Libyan turnabout, and the restraint of Syria in the post-Iraq period make this category appear less cogent than in the past. Whereas Dore Gold, *et al.* want observers to focus on the links between Iran and other Islamist groups, Benjamin emphasizes the force of Islamist/jihadist activities as compared to state terror.²³

ENDING RESISTANCE

Observers of and in the Muslim world note that many instances of "resistance" in the Middle East or Muslim world to Western incursion, influence, ideas, or actual political and military interference are identified as terrorism, which is most properly defined as a tactic. However, what is viewed in Lebanon as resistance to Israeli incursions, or demonstrations and sit-ins that protested the government of Fu'ad Saniura, or countering the March 14 coalition are called "terrorism" in the West (and in Israel); and Palestinian resistance to Israel is "terrorism." The actions of the American organization, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, which seeks to protect Muslims from discrimination or violence, have been labeled "a cover for terrorism," and so on. This allows for conflation of anti-Americanism, and Arab non-*salafi* groups with Islamist, and violent Islamist groups. Indeed, many Amer-

ican sources, including certain items read and recommended in DoD training and education, or governmentally-funded publications utilized by DoD, continue to confuse Arabs and Muslims,²⁴ cleaving to the Orientalist and racist vision of premodern peoples who engage in “Islam” as a revenge on modernity.

ZEALOUS TRANSFORMATION

A third problem evolves in some ways from the lack of precision in defining the ideas and enemies to be targeted as well as the ideas of a clash of civilizations, and that is the misperceptions and hubris of those Western intellectuals or members of government who assume that they can remake Islam, Muslims and their ideas, states and societies as they wish—without regard to the prior ideological currents or material circumstances. Reasons for the ambition and overreach of governmental planners and figures in the policy area are complex. They might well remember the maxim that the road to Hell is paved with good intentions. These intentions cause offense, or would do so if they were widely known. For instance, it is probably a mistake to assume that broad numbers of Muslims consciously desire to provide sanctuary to terrorists. My Muslim interlocutors felt it rather insulting to Muslims to assume that they have and could never develop anything other than failing or failed states that provide such sanctuary. Many of these individuals are first surprised, then offended, by discussions about failed (rather than developing) states, or those concerning Islam’s incompatibility with democracy. While some are willing to consider factors that have “gone wrong” in Islamic society, there is something fundamentally racist (see **O is for Orientalism**) about the assumptions that a particular religious community

eschews democracy and is incapable of democratic behavior. At the same time, certain Muslim extremists have indeed issued statements against democracy, pointing instead to *shura* (consultation) as a bona fide Islamic method of governance.

What is important is that transformative U.S. tactics and policies that are supposed to encourage democracy have had negative secondary effects as we are seeing today in Iraq. Elsewhere, a lukewarm or intermittent support of democratization causes Muslims to doubt the sincerity of U.S. intentions. An example of this somewhat evangelical zeal to transform Muslims, Islam, and Muslim societies may be noted in the TruthSpeak Forum which called for the United States, and specifically DoD, to stop using the word “jihad” or “jihadists” and refer instead to terrorism and criminals. More will be said about this tactic below, but just imagine if a Muslim expert or journalist initiated a campaign to teach Catholics not to use the word “reconciliation” (the modern term for confession) because she/he felt it led to the repetition of sin since it may be expiated, and suggested the imposition of a new term for reconciliation with a moral component. It is important for Muslim reforms to have a legitimate basis in Muslim communities and be neither imposed by the United States or its ally governments. So in this instance, a recommendation of a recent RAND study that an “Indonesian form of Islam” be emulated causes one to ask how this would be received in certain Arab Muslim societies—most probably as a signal that their own versions of Islam are not sufficiently liberal (the Western thought) or syncretic (the Muslim translation).

Of those ideas described below, a few of the more important are: (1) a recommendation to consider the *ummah*, the community of Muslim believers in a neutral

way, rather than a pathological locus of identity; (2) the need to understand that an American definition of a moderate Muslim may by no means coincide with Muslim ideas about the nature or views of “moderates”; and that (3) the bogeyman of a reinstated Caliphate has been overstated. The impact of U.S. policies in the Middle East and the Muslim world are causing the opposite of what many would like to see. Surveys show us that Muslims in the region do not trust the United States,²⁵ and do not believe the War on Terror is a bona fide endeavor.²⁶ The following ideas may help to illustrate the conceptual challenges to American policymakers aiming to reshape the Muslim world.

As the lack of precision is an extremely large problem, I address issues from A to Z, so readers can more easily locate concepts that interest them. (See Table of Contents.) These shortcomings in the definitions and proposed views of the issues enlarge the failings of American strategic communications to the region. At best, they suggest hypocritical or contradictory goals, and at worst, can aggravate the militant aim to enlarge jihad between the West and the Muslim world.

A is for Allah.

Allah is the Arabic and Muslim name for God. Muslims consider Allah to be the One God of the entire universe. Christian Arabs also use the same term “Allah” for God. Statements such as “their [Muslims’] Allah is different than your God” or “Muslims believe in a God called Allah” deny the emphatic monotheism of Islam and its universal message.

An interesting misconception about the United States is that it is free of religious bias and is devoid of religious influence or religiosity. American churches are

more popular and well-attended than many churches in old Europe, say, England. Even where churches are not as crowded on Sundays, public traditions in the United States and the working calendar are based on Christianity. As Christian fundamentalism has spread in the country, this trend has intensified. General concern about other religious traditions may or may not stem from the newly religious; sometimes such groups are more tolerant of the piety of other cultures. However, certain Christians insist that since they recognize Jesus “as my God,” then Muslim references to Allah are clearly different than their own.

Before and after 9/11, Americans of this variety opposed Muslims’ use of the word Allah in written texts, oaths, or ceremonies. Claiming such public and supposedly secular events can only recognize one religion, Christianity, and one Book, the *Bible*, reveals underlying prejudice. An example was the first Muslim Congressman’s desire to use the *Qur’an* (a copy once owned by Thomas Jefferson) in a swearing-in ceremony.²⁷ Keith Ellison, the freshman from Minnesota, had first taken part in the *en masse* public ceremony when the new members of Congress publicly promised to support and defend the U.S. Constitution, adding as they did “so help me God.” And that would be “one nation, under God” — my Allah and your God.

The U.S. Senate opens its sessions with a prayer. The American forefathers had not so strictly separated church and state as to forgo such convocations. On July 12, 2007, a Hindu chaplain from Reno, Nevada, Rajan Zed, opened the U.S. Senate’s session with a prayer from the *Rig Veda*, the first time that a Hindu prayer has been given in the Senate. Although a few protesters were arrested,²⁸ this demonstrates, like the story above, that Americans can support religious diversity.

A is for Apostasy.

It may also be useful for Americans to realize that political traditions in the Arab and Muslim world went through decades when religious discourse was rejected or at least ignored in favor of other philosophies. Sadiq al-`Azm, Syrian writer and professor of European philosophy, published *Naqd al-Fikr al-Dini* (*A Critique of Religious Thought*) in Beirut in 1969 which received hundreds of extremely angry responses from pious Muslims, and he became the “Muslim atheist” of that era. However, he was not put on trial as an apostate, as might have occurred had his book been published in the 1990s or later.²⁹ Far more commonly than Westerners know, Muslims have called for “insider reform”³⁰ to deal with freedom of expression issues. Today, however, as nonreligious Arab socialism has faded, atheism, like secularism, is often treated as apostasy. Muslim writers and public figures—from `Ali `Abd al-Raziq, at the beginning of the 20th century, to Salman Rushdie, Nasr Abu Zayd, and Taslima Nasrin have been charged with apostasy, or exceeding the “boundaries” of Islam. `Abd al-Raziq was a scholar of Islam and a *shari`ah* court judge whose 1925 book, *Islam and the Sources of Political Rule* (*al-Islam wa `usul al-hukm*), caused a scandal, and ruined `Abd al-Raziq’s career as he lost the title of *`alim* (religious scholar, see **U is for the `Ulama**) and could not again serve in a religious post. `Abd al-Raziq explained:

The main point of the book, for which I have been condemned is that Islam did not determine a specific regime, nor did it impose on the Muslims a particular system according to the requirements of which they must be governed; rather it has allowed us absolute freedom to organize the state in accordance with the intellectual,

social, and economic conditions in which we are found, taking into consideration our social development and the requirement of the times.³¹

Although I have written much the same thing below under **C is for the Caliphate**, in those years his argument was seen as a pointed challenge to the traditional shaykhs of al-Azhar. The Indian-based Caliphal movement was still alive, and Egyptian King Fu'ad had some (rather unrealistic) aspirations to become Caliph. The Council of Higher `Ulama (clerics) could not let his challenge pass, despite the way that liberals championed `Abd al-Raziq and his rights under the Egyptian Constitution. They put `Abd al-Raziq on trial on seven points of doctrine. He had not only shown that the Caliphate had a negative effect, was essentially a "secular" institution from Abu Bakr onwards and not required by the Qur'an or the Sunna, he had also rejected the ideas that the Caliphate was founded on *ijma`*, consensus, and that a world-wide Caliphate – a single government or state for Muslims – could ever be God's desire³² or serve religion. In other words, his views are quite antithetical to today's global jihadists, and the Council's primary charge was that `Abd al-Raziq had reduced the *shari'ah* to a "purely spiritual legislation."³³

Taslima Nasrin, a Bangladeshi poet, author, and physician, was first accused of apostasy by radical Islamists in 1990 because of her columns that criticized the treatment of women in Islam and then later for her book, *Lajja (Shame)*, which discussed the treatment of the Hindu minority. She went into exile, first to Sweden, then West Bengal. Salman Rushdie's novel, *Satanic Verses*, led to accusations of apostasy, mainly because Muslims believed it defamed the Prophet in its

exploration of the so-called *gharaniq*, the verses excised from the Qur'an when it was recensed during Islam's early years. Rushdie mocks religious "blind faith" of both the Hindu and Muslim variety, and his powerful writing style included certain historically accurate details.

Nasr Abu Zayd's case was more similar to `Ali `Abd al-Raziq's. Not seeking publicity, as Rushdie (or his publisher) may have done, Abu Zayd was an assistant professor at Cairo University who sought promotion in 1992 based on his work in Islamic studies. Abu Zayd did not make a case for secularism; instead, his sin was really the careful application of an academic methodology to the sacred text. A committee member argued that he had blasphemed in some of his work and publicly charged him with apostasy in a Friday sermon in 1993. This led to a legal effort to forcibly divorce Abu Zayd (by third party) from his wife because a Muslim woman cannot be married to a non-Muslim (apostate) man. He was eventually promoted, but he was then ruled an apostate, and legal appeals to divorce him were upheld in higher courts. He and his wife left Egypt for the Netherlands.

Apostasy is the crime of repudiating Islam – that is, of a Muslim declaring that he is not a Muslim. In the early days of Islam, apostasy represented treason and alliance with the enemies of the Muslims, and required military suppression. In Iraq, radical anti-occupation groups with a salafist outlook (jihadi-salafist) label the Shi'a "apostate-Crusaders" along with, or instead of, the usual epithet "renegade" (*rafidhi*).

Muslim-Muslim charges of apostasy date far back in history. Naturally, they represent political, cultural, and sometimes sectarian struggle. However, such disputes gained more circulation and legitimacy through the

media, especially when they expressed anti-liberal or anti-Western stances of conservative Muslims or activist Islamists. In the GWOT, if Americans require their allies to uphold and publicize liberal, particularly secularist, views, these types of attacks may take place. They indicate a crisis of legitimacy within the *ummah* that can only be solved by strengthening the basis for dialogue as well as freedom of speech and the press, ideally via internal rather than external activity.

Apostasy is a crime pertaining only to Muslims. It should not—according to classical interpretations of Islamic law—be prosecuted unless the apostate admits his denial of faith. In other words, accusations of apostasy are not supposed to discourage Muslim opinion and expression. Yet, quite often people have been accused of “going beyond the bounds of Islam,” (and non-Muslim castigations of Islam are a third level of offense). On this count, Egyptian feminist Nawal al-Saadawi was attacked when a magazine quoted her as saying that the kissing of the black stone of the Ka’bah at Mecca was originally a pre-Islamic custom.

Muslims and non-Muslims can be accused of blaspheming the prophets. Lebanese Christian musician Marcel Khalifa was put on trial for including lyrics about the Prophet Yusuf (Joseph) in his songs. Westerners will recall the violent demonstrations that protested Danish cartoons lampooning the Prophet Muhammad, which were reproduced in other European newspapers in 2005. Muslims saw these as a very clear attack on prophecy—disrespect and hatred for their Prophet. Not all Muslims agreed that the Danish newspaper or government needed to apologize, however many felt so strongly that they launched a boycott of Danish products or protested. And in a sequel, a Swedish newspaper published

another cartoon lampooning the Prophet. Muslims themselves have been increasingly restricted by certain intellectual boundaries and traditions and have been practicing censorship and self-censorship for a very long time; and certain attacks are felt keenly whether of Muslim or Western origin. Liberal and conservative camps of Muslims are already at war with each other over a variety of issues. Western efforts to encourage secularism and liberalism under the label “moderate Islam” may be, and in some cases already are being met with charges of apostasy or blasphemy.

At the same time, allegations communicated as part of the GWOT aimed at Muslim beliefs are also taken as public insults to religion. This is a very unfortunate aspect of the strategically oriented writing about the GWOT which is only exaggerated when Westerners confuse “*jihadi* ideology” with all other Muslims intellectual trends and beliefs.

B is for *Bast* (as H is for *Haram*).

Bast means sanctuary, or taking sanctuary in Farsi, and also holding a sit-in or protest in a space around a shrine. It is very similar to one of the functional aspects of the Arabic word, *haram*, denoting the political inviolability of shrines sacred to Islam or particular Muslim figures as at the tomb of the Eighth Imam, Reza, at Mashhad in Iran. At the gates—or in a designated area around these shrines—the power of the state ends, and even those who have broken its laws—debtors, for example—could not be seized. Protests held within such spaces, or formal refuge sought there, might also require a remedy. This is similar to the sanctuary provided in embassies to diplomatic personnel. Indeed, a famous pro-Constitution *bast* was led by Iranians on the grounds of the British legation, (and

another held by anti-Constitution clerics) during Iran's Constitutional Revolution.³⁴ This transforms *bast* into a mediating space, similar to cases when combatants, lovers, or accused persons take refuge at the home of tribal or political leader.

Amazingly, Americans supervising operations in Iraq who questioned the need to refrain from attacking mosques in Iraq after 2003, especially those being used by insurgents, were unaware of this principle. This idea of refuge in a religious space (and sometimes a political one) is essential to an understanding of the dynamic between state and clerical power. The GWOT can never be won if it means that governments will subdue the independence and sanctity of religious spaces, which indeed, have sheltered all types of refuge-seekers. When governments must invade these spaces, as during the 1979 takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca and holding of hostages, or when combatants attack holy spaces like the Askari mosque at Samarra, a price is paid in a forfeit of legitimacy.

B is for Bin Ladin.

Bin Ladin arose as a figure somewhat in search of a movement. He is not a leading Islamic scholar, a politician, or a prolific author. He is not the singular and solitary cause of global terrorism. Indeed, his role as a funder and what has been described as a rather quiet charismatic figure in the jihadist movement may be revised in decades to come.³⁵ It is common to hear some Muslims (as well as others opposed to U.S. policy in the GWOT) say that bin Ladin has been made into a bogeyman; a larger than life figure who can embody Terror with a capital T since the American people cannot easily remember all of these foreign actors and

movements, their names, and differences between them. In Iraq, Zarqawi and his successor, al-Masri, in the *al-Qa'ida fi bilad al-rafidhayn* has played a similar role; substituting a singular Enemy for a complex multiple one with over 40 different groups.

In certain treatises, bin Ladin has become an intellectual superman who somehow combines a Wahhabi influence along with the traditions of Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Abu al-'Ala Mawdudi—the trinity of early Islamism. The differences between these individuals and the movements they were part of is unfortunately glossed over, and we are supposed to understand that all Islamists are capable of bin Ladin's extremism, according to some of the fuzzier searches for al-Qa'ida's roots.³⁶ Quite a few have focused on the new "global" nature of the threat because earlier Islamists had not directly targeted the West, or far enemy, instead of local Muslim governments.³⁷ I have tried instead to show how bin Ladin, Azzam (his teacher), al-Zawahiri, and others actually represent a "new *jihad*," differentiated from the previous generation of extremists by their larger scale attacks on the United States and Westerners in the Middle East, and their goal of increased hostilities (rather than merely threatening the authority and economies of local rulers).³⁸

The war of ideas has not yet addressed Muslim disbelief that bin Ladin, Arabs, or Muslims were really responsible for 9/11 and the degree to which some may still be attracted to the jihadist cause. Instead, these ideas are treated as conspiracy theories of no merit, and Muslims are described as people who lack rationality, and, accordingly, circulate conspiracy theories. To understand why some Muslims continue to admire bin Ladin requires some understanding of his³⁹ or the *mujahidin's* charisma as defenders of Islam. Perhaps the

strongest attraction for bin Ladin is obtained through Muslim antipathy to U.S. foreign policy, including U.S. indifference to the Palestinian population and attacks on Muslims in the region in Afghanistan and in Iraq. One solution would be to alter our foreign policy – more energetically working towards a just solution to the Palestinian-Israeli dispute; to admit the shortcomings in our policies in Afghanistan and Iraq; and, particularly in Iraq, cease efforts to link our war on terrorism with other policies intended to transform the region into the “New Middle East” whether by the regime change in Iraq or by blaming Iran for interference. Some of bin Ladin’s Robin Hood aura might be undone that way, and should be accompanied with new policies toward Pakistan (these appear to be in the works), now the central front for al-Qa’ida.

C is for the Caliphate.

The Caliphate was a uniquely Muslim political institution that defined the head of state after the Prophet’s death. The Caliph was initially selected by a group of community leaders and then became a hereditary office under the Ummayyad rulers. The institution prevailed until the rise of smaller states in the 10th century, and was destroyed by the Mongol invaders in 1258 A.D. Muslims regard it as being superior to the other forms of rule in that period, whether tribal or monarchic, because the Caliph was supposed to uphold the *shari`ah*, Islamic law, thus ensuring justice and not tyranny. The essential problems of the Caliphate were political, economic, and circumstantial, reflecting the declining power of the Caliph vis-à-vis his own governors and generals and other world rulers. Local conditions sometimes

played a role as with the declining income of the Tigris-Euphrates valley which affected the revenues of the Abbasid Caliphate. Then mismanagement of the royal court, together with failure of central civil authority under the Caliph Mutawwakil, eroded the idea of Muslim unity that girded the Caliphate.⁴⁰ The crisis of disunity also affected governors-turned-local-rulers who continued the Caliphate as delegates, like the Samanids, who in turn delegated power to their Turkic slave soldiery. The unruliness of mercenary soldiery was also a cause of the decline of the Fatimid Caliphate.⁴¹ Muslims are aware of the institutional failings of the Caliphate, and that it continued on after the 11th century in name only, despite the Ottoman sultan's fictitious claim to be the Caliph at the outset of World War I, and a movement that called for the restoration of the Caliphate arose in the late 19th century. Most Muslims regarded this proposition as impractical, however much they desired Muslim unity. With the solidification and modernization of Muslim nations, the dream of the Caliphate has faded for many, but countless ordinary Muslims and religious officials refer to it for historical and philosophical reasons, and for the sake of contrast with arbitrary, despotic, or authoritarian rulers.

The Qur'an does not specify the Caliphate. If it had, the very different form of Islamic government that was adopted in Iran—*vilayat-e faqih*, rule of the jurist—might have faltered on these grounds. Indeed, because the Qur'an does not specify a particular form of government, a democratic Islamic state could arise. It is not so much what form an Islamic government takes, but what it **does** that is important. At the same time, a different message to Muslims who live in a variety of political systems is that they should emphasize their

ability to live as good (pious) Muslims whether under an Arab or Asian Muslim government or the American or European democracies.

When bin Ladin and other radical jihadist leaders decry democracy, they do argue that Muslims should reestablish a Caliphate, or territory ruled by an *amir* (prince or leader). They hold that a Western-style majority-rule democracy is meant to enact the will of the people, but not necessarily support *shari`ah*, morality, justice, or an Islamic way of life—their goals and the “how” rather than the “what” of Muslim life.

U.S. Government agencies, the defense community, and security research centers have made far too much of the Caliphate. By denouncing it, they are trouncing on Muslims’ idealized history and institutions. In any case, the radical jihadists lack the power to establish a large contiguous state, so their *`imarah* (amirate, also a legitimate form of government) can exist in a spotty fashion, in various noncontiguous areas, neighborhoods of large cities, wherever their followers are, or virtually. According to their own logic, their Islamic state and society already exists.

If Muslims knew about the constant denigrations of the Caliphate in the West, they would cringe. By reading, they may come across some of these instance, like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 2020 *World Report* which presented what appears to be a tongue-in-cheek scenario whereby a Caliph has been reinstated to successfully offset the appeal of Usama bin Ladin’s grandson. Perhaps Western powers will try to recreate a Caliphate so as to centralize Islam and install a Pope-like Caliph with Western approval to counter the informal, chaotic, and eclectic nature of Islamic authority. A new false Caliph of this sort does not sound like a very promising future for Muslims.

C is for the Crusaders.

Islam is part of the Abrahamic tradition. Indeed, Muslims pray that the Prophet Muhammad and his descendents be blessed, just as Allah previously blessed the Prophet Ibrahim (Abraham) and his descendents. Christians are not viewed as vile enemies of Muslims in Islam. However, an unfortunate part of the growing discourse of “new jihad” combines historic invective against Christian enemies of Muslim territory and today’s imperialists, the (primarily Christian) American-led coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. A narrative based on the historic experience of the Crusades has become part of the symbols utilized by al-Zawahiri and others to explain conflict between the West and Islam.

When President Bush actually called the War on Terrorism a “Crusade” — that naturally intensified the sense of Muslims that they are under siege, particularly those who disapproved of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, garden variety prejudice against Christians (like that against Jews) has become a problem in Muslim communities. This need not be the case, and is largely a result of ignorance and *salafi* selective reading of the Qur’an, combined with the observation that the West uses ethnic and religious minorities to divide the East. This is historical fact, first apparent in the most favored nation treaties known as the Capitulations. It is nevertheless counterproductive for Americans to accuse Muslims of prejudice when they may not be propagating it. And Americans cannot put an end to the use of the term “Crusader” or “Crusade” for now. Calls and re-education for preachers to control their discourse has occurred, but at the same time, people feel very strongly about their rights to political

comment, especially when they cannot strongly impact their countries' policies. Hence, the Crusader motif (symbol of the imperialist Westerner) is the flip side of the American stress on the clash of civilizations.

Whereas al-Zarqawi and other fighters in Iraq, and bin Ladin, have used the word "Crusader" to include Western aid organizations and United Nations (UN) forces and representatives, locals may either accept this extension of enemy-status (as in Afghanistan) or not (as in Darfur). Bin Ladin issued a call for jihadists to travel to Darfur in 2006, as did Ayman al-Zawahiri, to battle UN troops there.⁴² However, that particular call has not generated much of a response to date, and we do not really know why—possibly these inspirational messages are only of import when there is a stronger local resistance. In other words, sometimes the argument of defensive jihad against Crusaders does not suffice.

D is for Democracy.

Since this monograph primarily disputes Western strategic messages to the Muslim world, there is no space for a thorough exploration of the compatibility of Islam and Muslim society with democracy (or liberal democracy). One of the most novel aspects of American national security strategy in the post-9/11 period is its proposal to foster democracy as a preventive to terrorism. This presupposes Muslim suspicion of or lack of enthusiasm for democracy. Yet, "secularism is not a prerequisite to democracy; religion can play a significant role in democratic politics, as it does in the United States."⁴³ A great many experts have agreed that efforts to promote democracy "must engage Islam," and that political reform will fail if Islamists are excluded.⁴⁴

The difficulty for certain Muslims (including salafists) is that they define democracy as popular sovereignty and rule of the majority. That majority also creates and makes laws, directly or by proxy, as in the United States, by electing representatives who craft laws. These laws are considered illegitimate because they are man-made, especially when they contradict principles of *shari`ah*. This is why the monarchy in Saudi Arabia insists that their governance relies on the Qur`an (there is no Constitution). Khaled Abou El Fadl, a legal scholar, explains that certain values promoted by a democracy—the protection of individual rights, for instance, require rethinking. He suggests this possibility, along with the use of *shura*, consultation—not the same as democracy, but a historically recommended component of good Islamic governance. He argues that because justice is the aim of good Muslim governance, the rule of law is essential. But neither West nor East should think of *shari`ah* as being monolithic, nor free of human interpretation. The way it *has* been interpreted is not necessarily the way it *could* be interpreted, hence reform, acceptance of diversity, and individual rights, are, in Abou El Fadl’s view, eminently possible. However, he explains that modern Muslims have themselves interfered with the promotion of individual rights because many Muslims assume, wrongly, that Islamic law involves duties rather than rights, and that the latter are based on the *ummah*—they are “collectivist.” Despite that, if democratic lawmaking were to prioritize God’s sovereignty, then a stronger case could be made for democracy.⁴⁵

One of the earliest modern defenses of democracy came from Rifa`a Rafi` al-Tahtawi, a young shaykh, teacher, preacher, and translator who visited France

in the 19th century as an imam accompanying an Egyptian military delegation. During al-Tahtawi's highly productive career, he wrote extensively about this Western society; directed a school for translators; eventually headed the military academy; translated the Napoleonic Code and numerous literary works; wrote the first modern Arabic grammar, philosophical works, a history of Egypt, and works on pedagogy; and edited several periodicals. He believed that the pluralism of Muslim societies could support democracy, a system that could actually "cure" the *ummah* of its decided lack of freedom. He praised the democratic and anti-tyrannical aims of the 1830 revolution against King Charles X.⁴⁶

Azzam Tammimi, a Palestinian Islamist scholar and writer, has summarized key modern Muslim thinkers' exploration of democracy from al-Tahtawi through Malik Bennabi, who influenced the Tunisian Islamist leader, Rashid Ghannouchi, who in turn supports pluralism, an important component of democracy.⁴⁷ Not all emphasize exactly the same aspects of democracy, but the point is that they are enthusiastic about various approaches to democracy.

Abd al-Karim Soroush is a controversial Iranian academic who took part in the Islamic revolution and whose teaching and speaking profile was suppressed in Iran, yet he has obtained quite a following outside the country. Soroush argues that because Islam supports and requires freedom, it is a necessary complement to democracy.⁴⁸

The United States historically has attempted to spread "liberal values" in the Middle East, and during the Cold War attempted to offset Arab socialism that was popular at the time. As part of its GWOT, the country has particularly emphasized democratization

in a New Middle East. The topic has been widely discussed,⁴⁹ but Americans might not be fully aware of the degree of suspicion expressed by those in the region, especially when they also read or know that Westerners often view Islam as inherently anti-democratic.⁵⁰ In the *Arab Public Opinion Survey of 2006* (most in the survey are Muslims) 68 percent of the 3,850 polled did not believe that democracy was a “real” objective of the United States.⁵¹ Other Western voices highlight the obstacles to democracy—political authoritarianism, or military dominance over politics⁵²—that have developed in various nations in the Muslim world. Yet, pro-democratic groups exist throughout the region. Americans are often unaware of the efforts made by local groups to practice democracy, for example, in forming a “shadow opposition” in Egypt,⁵³ or when Middle Eastern women’s nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) formed a shadow delegation to the Beijing + Five conference to provide balance to the official governmental delegations.

A different variant of critic assumes that Islamists (as opposed to Muslims) cannot be democratic; and that liberals and Westerners are duping themselves into believing that they may express a variant of democracy.⁵⁴ Such critics assert that Islamists will not provide representation to women or religious minorities, and will enforce *shari`ah* on all. Groups like Hizbullah, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood have not shown these tendencies so far, although it is true that some other Islamist movements exclude women from leadership positions.

In my travels during the Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus Springs, and in the Arabian Gulf, I met with intelligent people who asked me these questions:

a. Why do Americans speak to us as if we’ve never thought about democratization?

b. Why do Americans announce their plans to establish such programs and centers in our countries, instead of asking us [first] what might work or be beneficial here?

c. What's in it for us? Will it help us to appear to be aiding the United States? Don't Americans realize that it might be dangerous for us to be accused of aiding Western-style democratization? We hope we don't encounter the fate of sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim (whose efforts to secure judicial review of elections, register voters, and publish about sectarianism were met with charges of treason).

At the time of this writing, U.S. support of democratization is strongly questioned because of its firm opposition to the democratically-elected Palestinian Hamas government and the various tactics taken against that organization. Second, Muslims, many of whom supported Hizbullah's stance against Israel in the summer of 2006, note that the United States would also like to diminish that organization's profile in Lebanon. And once again, Hizbullah representatives have been democratically elected to public office in Lebanon.

In Saudi Arabia where municipal elections were held for the first time in decades in 2005, much was made of the election of Islamist candidates and the use of Islamic slogans in campaigning via cell phones. Where Islamism is strong, one must expect democratic exercises to result in greater support for such candidates. However, if the United States withholds its enthusiasm for more open elections out of fear that Islamist or pro-Islamist candidates may succeed (as in the Palestinian Authority as well as Saudi Arabia or Egypt) and calls for a focus on other types of democratic development,

there is risk of losing the growing popular support and interest in political participation even in limited electoral exercises (as in Saudi Arabia).

E is for Education (Islamic).

An interesting aspect of the War on Terrorism is the Western insistence that Muslims must stop the spread of terrorism “in their *madrasahs*” and via Islamic education. In the supposedly new strategic approach wherein Islamist militancy is described as an epidemic, the *madrasahs* are “incubators.”⁵⁵ However, whereas the Taliban were students of religious institutes, the 9/11 bombers were not. The larger recent violent Islamist actions have been planned by individuals with college educations, not those indoctrinated in religious curricula.⁵⁶ Somehow the idea that students in *madrasahs* in Pakistan learned about and supported jihad has expanded to a policy recommendation that Muslims should not have *madrasahs*, or worse, that Islamic education is at best unnecessary, or routinely a form of brainwashing.

Detailed studies of Islamic education or Muslim educational systems (two different projects) are rather limited and difficult to carry out if the purpose is primarily political. The memorization and transmission of texts is not the only means of Islamic education, although it has been routinely opposed for “noncritical learning” which exhibits a Western ignorance of other aspects of learning, although philosophy and pedagogy have suffered since the medieval period.⁵⁷ By necessity, most modern studies focused on curricula, the relationship between large institutions and the state as in Egypt or Iran, the clerics involved in education, or the institutions in specific periods.⁵⁸ One important sidebar is that

the modern state of education suffered from the way that nationalized education was established, and its divorce from Islamic education, which made it appear a rival⁵⁹ primarily serving the interests of the colonial state.⁶⁰ Study circles,⁶¹ mosques, home-based Muslim education, the Islamization of knowledge project, and Islamist approaches to education are unknown to or poorly understood by Western critics.⁶² Other studies have examined changes in education in the region with the introduction of Western-style colleges and universities, or the need for reform or retention of authentic Islamic educational principles.⁶³ With the GWOT, the knowledge that numerous radicals were educated, for example at Umm al-Qura University in Mecca, was reduced to the message – “stop them from teaching hate.” Outside scrutiny of the Saudi Arabian system has, for example, engendered more suspicion about religious education without a clear understanding of the need for religiously well-educated individuals as well as educators and officials. Certainly for Muslims to abandon their educational system would damage their religious knowledge and intellectual heritage.

Yet the International Crisis Group recommended as an antidote to radicalism a governmental emphasis on public schools in Pakistan and denial of support to the *madrasah* sector.⁶⁴ This 2002 report also, Christine Fair notes, misestimated the number of *madaris* students at one-third of all students in Pakistan, whereas only about 4 to 7 percent of students are enrolled in such schools. Other researchers (Jessica Stern estimates 40,000 to 50,000; and Peter Singer, 45,000) have far overestimated the numbers of actual *madaris*, as has the 9/11 Commission Report, if official Pakistani statistics showing less than 7,000 *madaris* are correct.⁶⁵

Also, Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey found that few of the 79 terrorists they studied who were involved in most prominent anti-Western attacks had been educated in *madrasahs*; the architects of these attacks were university-educated, and so Bergen and Pandey have made the point that *madrasahs* should not be scapegoated.⁶⁶ Around the region, support for private Islamic education from kindergarten through college is actually growing. This should give pause to those who see secularism as the solution in the war of ideas.

Apparently, recruitment of fighters occurs in public schools (where these exist separately from Islamic schools, which is in most countries) more frequently than in other systems, and the poor status, materials, overcrowding, or dearth of teachers that lead to undereducation or poor matriculation rates are as problematic as religio-political messages emanating from curriculum. These messages cannot be sanitized by Westerners or local authorities through simple censorship; it is essential to teach pre-collegial or advanced students to think for themselves so as to resist indoctrination, and that cannot be accomplished through counterindoctrination.

The U.S. National Security Council (NSC) and the CIA think otherwise, however. A strategy called “Muslim World Outreach” derives from the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which, according to David Kaplan, means that the United States has a national security interest in what goes on within Islam itself—not only in the Islamic world. Controversial programs have begun to reform religious education, clerics, scholars, and “neutralize militant anti-American” preachers, and yes, Islam itself.⁶⁷ In Syria, the UN Development Program initiated a program to provide training to religious scholars and institutions.

In Syria, money talks, and an increase of \$20 a month to deplorably low salaries for religious officials helped provide support for the program. Syrian Islamists nevertheless protested that the West needs to stay out of the inter-Islamic task of Islamic reforms.⁶⁸ The distinction between “government” religious officials and opposition, and between state-appointed teachers and popular private teachers are issues. So too, is the traditional wealth of knowledge that is imparted in secondary or higher Islamic learning, but in very specific formats. To those who understand Islam as a panoply and range of views, it is no doubt disconcerting to hear a new official dogma developing.

E is for Epidemiology.

Briefly, an epidemiological approach to militant Islamism has been proposed by Paul Stares and others. And once again, my objections concern, first, the wisdom of pathologizing what has long since become a norm, second, the form that the “inoculation” takes against what he terms militant Islamism (one might more narrowly target violent jihadism), and third, the effect that this concept has and will have on Muslims. An “epidemic” carries the useful connotations of containment, inoculation, and cure. In the security thinking that passes for antiterrorism, identification of an enemy threat is the first stage. The notion of an epidemic will raise costs by rationalizing higher stages of threat preparation and reduction and random check, arrest, and investigation procedures. Commonplace, or ordinary networks of friends, families, and occupational contacts become suspicious, and individuals will shut down to outsiders. Psychologically, the idea of inoculation is achieved through isolation (of Americans

or other Westerners), but that is the antithesis of necessary and expanded communication between the West and Muslims. Once again, it seems the West is just echoing radical Islamists who have for many years described the sickness of society and Islam as the cure.

E is for Europe.

Attention has turned to Muslims in Europe because of violent attacks or attack attempts there—in London, Madrid, Germany, and Scotland—and in tracking various networks. Even aside from recent terrorism, questions about Muslim participation in European society and politics have become very complicated.⁶⁹ The numbers of Muslims have increased; there are at least 15 million Muslims in Western Europe. Also, as Islamism grew within the Middle East and the Muslim world, so too have the numbers of European Muslims who identify with Islamist values. Somewhat connected to this phenomenon, but also to the difficulty of maintaining their cultural identity and religious values, Muslim groups and movements became more activist in the West⁷⁰ than in previous decades of immigration to the continent. A concomitant rise in racism and anti-immigration in Europe has heightened tensions in various locations.

Muslims encountered different sets of public policies and social attitudes whether in Germany, where they remain noncitizen “guest workers” even into a third generation born in the country; or in France, where assimilation to a French nationalism has been required, yet economic and social opportunities were limited and remain very constrained.⁷¹ Consequently, segregated and disadvantaged pockets of immigrant

culture rebelled with acts of vandalism. In England, Muslims are treated—as is true of most other parts of Europe—as a different racial group, and not only religious and national minorities. Europe has attracted economic and political immigrants and exiles: groups which provide incomes to their impoverished families, but also political exiles and intellectuals who took advantage of Europe's relative freedoms of association and the press to promote their causes—opposition to the Shah, or now to the Islamic Republic of Iran, opposition to Saddam Hussein, or to the Egyptian regime of Husni Mubarak, the Saudi royal family, etc.

In some countries like Belgium and the Netherlands, Islamic education has been a part of the national school system, allowing authorities input into what is taught and a site of observation. At the same time, here and elsewhere, certain mosque communities were more *salafi* in orientation than others. While this discussion concerns the experiences of Muslims in Europe, it must be remembered that European countries have various changing agendas in the Middle East, separately, and as part of the European Union (EU).⁷²

The RAND study, "Building Moderate Muslim Networks," implicitly suggests that Muslims who assimilate to European values and are anti-Islamist are compatible with the West, thus bolstering the study's main thesis that moderation equals secularist Islam. The study does not rely on survey data, and it is difficult to understand its characterization of Muslims, not all of whom consciously choose their views about Europe and Islam. The study seems to overlook the fact that "separatist" Muslims (they are defined as looking "forward to the Islamization of Europe"⁷³—which is arguable—they may simply be trying to preserve their Muslim identity) probably represent

the largest numbers of Muslims in Europe today, and this is not necessarily a conscious choice made by these individuals but a matter of family and community values. The study identifies Muslims in Europe who are anti-Islamist as “moderates,” and these primarily argue for assimilation, rather than cultural assertion, or the idea that Muslims must live according to the *shari`ah* wherever they are. Certain anti-Islamists are identified—Bassam Tibi, once a proponent of Arab nationalism and a secular Muslim; Samia Labidi who published *Electrochoc*; Mehdi Mozaffari, an Iranian refugee and academic who is a signatory to a document that labels Islamism and totalitarianism; and Soheib Bencheikh, the Grand Mufti of Marseille.⁷⁴ There is no mention of figures like Tariq Ramadan, the popular Swiss Islamic thinker, most probably because Campus Watch (the McCarthy-style list slamming prominent Arab and Muslim academics and community leaders) has labeled him a “false moderate”—and he is the grandson of Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood.

While the figures described represent certain liberal Muslims, it is very hard to see how these figures could bridge the divide and dialogue with Islamists. In more virulent debates—such as the Salman Rushdie affair, the law limiting wearing of *hijab* in France, the murder of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands, the Danish cartoon controversy, and the role of Muslims opposed to terrorism—it is quite unhelpful to carve out and accentuate opposing, irreconcilable “sides” for Muslims—thereby creating a civil war, or *fitna* in Europe between “Europeans” and their Muslims allies and other nonassimilationist Muslims.

This new effort to define “moderates” who are actually liberals and/or assimilationists is countered

by Muslims like Briton Kamal El-Helbawy who hopes to develop a Muslim discourse that truly challenges terrorism. Helbawy, admittedly an Islamist figure since he is a past spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood, calls for a different solution for Muslims in Europe which he calls “balanced integration,” whereby they would retain their own identity, but play an “active role in their adopted countries and societies,” working with governments to tackle all forms of injustice. In the freer atmosphere of the West, they should “unburden themselves of superstitious and false beliefs and practices which lead to disunity and fragmentation.”⁷⁵

Muslim openness to Islamism **and** democracy is probably reflected in Europe among more recent immigrants because pro-democratic attitudes have grown in the Middle East and Muslim world over the last 20 or so years. The post-9/11 treatment of Muslims and strategic messages on Islam are doing some damage to the esteem for Western-style governments.

Part of the damaging message is that Muslims are anti-democratic. We do have survey data about country attitudes towards democracy, development, and change as collected by the *World Values Survey*, the *AfroBarometer*, the Pew Center multi-country surveys, and other studies.⁷⁶ However, these attitudes vary greatly depending on the country of origin, due to individuals’ practical experience with their own (frequently authoritarian) government. One study of 31,000 Muslims showed that a large number (over 40 percent) did not idealize any country as an exemplar of democracy, and that Islamists were less likely to state an ideal system, since few qualify as Islamic states.⁷⁷ In addition, some scholars have gone further to focus on the fact that individuals who supported Islamism did not necessarily oppose democracy, and vice versa, although there were differences on particular issues.⁷⁸

F is for *Fitna*.

The Arab and other parts of the developing world have long accused (often with valid proof) the West of manipulating Middle Eastern groups against each other in a “divide and conquer” strategy that is often described as a form of neocolonialism. In fact, the United States and European powers did cultivate certain Middle Eastern groups first to support the mandate governments, and then later as part of U.S. Cold War policies. One general Muslim theme today is that the West is now sowing *fitna*, or civil war between Muslims, which is forbidden in Islam. Americans might be bewildered by this allegation, especially when the press claims that it was only in the wake of Iraqi elections that the Sunni and Shi`a began to attack each other. They might justifiably complain they are not to blame for the deep antipathy expressed by various religious groups toward each other. However, one reason for the accusations lies in the explosion of media attention, for example, to the Sunni-Shi`a divide which tends to portray the clash as an ancient blood feud, and not as the result of concrete, contemporary political interests, or the theory of a new Shi`a crescent of power that might counter the Sunni salafi revival since the 1970s.

Accusations of Western-aided *fitna* extends beyond Iraq. For example, the United States supported Israel in its boycott of Hamas and arrests and detentions of elected representatives, and has also supported Fatah in the conflict between the two Palestinian groups, while calling for an end to violence. Since Hamas represents an elected majority among the Palestinians, this means the United States has assented to an ongoing

peace initiative that lacks representation for over one-half of the Palestinian population. Here, the strongest accusation of *fitna* attaches to Israel, and the United States is merely playing a supporting role.

Lebanon has been split into two camps, one supporting the tribunal on the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri and his son who heads the Future coalition along with anti-Syrian (mainly) Christian representatives, and the other comprised of Christian (and also anti-Syrian) General Michel Aoun and his supporters and Hizbullah and its supporters. *Fitna* had already debilitated Lebanon and rendered its institutions impotent for many years of civil war. The newer conflict paralyzed the presidential election process; the election was put off 10 times by January 8, 2008. Although a compromise candidate, General Michel Suleiman, was accepted by both camps, the election process and the structure of the new government remained under dispute.

Fitna permeates Afghanistan and is evidenced in the central government's limited control over the country, with various other political forces and the Taliban vying for hegemony over various areas. *Fitna* similarly threatens Yemen, Pakistan, Syria, Kuwait and possibly Saudi Arabia; and through these examples, one should understand that *fitna* has a political and a strategic meaning going beyond its religious definition of social schism.

G is for Guantanamo (and Renditions).

Abuses carried out at Abu Ghraib, alleged abuses and suspension of legal rights at Guantanamo (a former prisoner now speaks at European mosques), and in the cover-up of various incidents there, along

with the issue of renditions, and several incidents in Iraq, including the rape and murder of a young girl at Haditha along with her family, have all outraged Muslims. Crimes against innocent Iraqis in war-time and mistreatment of prisoners may seem unavoidable to Americans due to the chaotic conditions in war situations. They may blame the current dissension over what constitutes torture in exceptional circumstances, or see this as an issue of media expansion of the bad deeds of a few misguided or poorly supervised individuals. However, the United States has projected a strong message to the world about living under a "rule of law," where the principle of being innocent until proven guilty and the human rights afforded by the Western systems of democracy should be defended. Some damage to American claims of justice and rule of law is irreparable, even if Guantanamo is closed, which would be desirable.

The problem with facilities that treat alleged terrorists as individuals in a special legal category is that the United States thereby lowers its legal and humanitarian standards to an unacceptable level. This happens as well, when, in the quest for information in the War on Terror, prisoners are remanded to countries where interrogations include more forms of legalized torture, or when U.S. citizens lose their rights to privacy. The counterargument is that al-Qa'ida combatants are not the same as ordinary military combatants, they are unlawful combatants. Still, there have been problems: Innocent individuals have been accused of being unlawful combatants, and both the guilty and the innocent lack due process, rights to examine evidence, and so on. Khaled Abou El Fadl, a credible academic, recounted American Muslims' complaints of summary and preemptive detentions, false charges, torture by proxy (by being moved to other countries) and that:

There is a widespread perception in the Muslim community that in a significant number of cases the use of secret evidence proved to be unreliable and unjust. My own experience in legal practice is consistent with this widespread view. In several cases, detainees were not able to challenge the accuracy of the secret evidence used against them, and therefore, effectively were denied the opportunity to vigorously defend themselves.⁷⁹

First, military tribunals do not afford the same degree of justice and due process as individuals would receive under American and European laws. Second, Muslims note (as do many Western observers) that renditions subject individuals to torture, which is unacceptable. Third, by treating prisoners and suspected terrorists unjustly, the United States gives more grist to those groups (not only al-Qa'ida) who treat their own prisoners unfairly. Instead of living up to its Wilsonian ideals, the United States demonstrates a similarity to undemocratic Muslim rulers who deny their citizens basic human rights.

Terrifying or attacking and imprisoning the families of suspected terrorists, bulldozing property of those related to suspects, and destroying crops (tactics common in the region, for example, used by Saddam Hussein but also employed by Western forces⁸⁰) are unjust because they punish individuals for the alleged or suspected crimes of others. Such collective punishments are prohibited under international law. A slightly different problem was the large number of detainees in Iraq who were held but never charged, and those who were mistreated either by U.S. forces or later by the Iraqi police and army.⁸¹

As for the jihadists, it is horribly wrong and un-Islamic for them to behead and kidnap their Western

hostages, to have unleashed the demon of suicide attacks, threaten the future of their societies, and then claim martyrdom. It does not matter if they justify their actions by pointing to American lack of justice at Guantanamo or Abu Ghraib; it is unlawful in Islam to treat noncombatants or even enemy prisoners in this way. Yet, it is essential that the majority of law-abiding and peace-loving Muslims do not view the United States as the leader of a crusade in which the treatment of prisoners is as brutal as that of the governments of Saddam Husayn, Hafiz al-Asad, or others in the region. At the same time, Muslims have no historical monopoly on mistreatment of “enemies”; Napoleon Bonaparte’s forces beheaded 900 Egyptians during his military venture into that country and dumped their heads in public to impress the populace of their power.⁸²

A suggestion that the United States create a preventive detention system overseen by a “national security court composed of federal judges with life tenure” should send chills down the spines of Americans. It would, in effect, be a parallel to the Egyptian system of “security courts,” but according to its proponents, done right – congressionally sanctioned.⁸³

H is for *Hakmiyyah*.

Hakmiyyah is the concept that sovereignty belongs solely to God. The root h-k-m means to govern, and the theory of the state and its role in upholding Islamic values and furthering justice has developed over time. Models of the ideal state and form of governance differ somewhat from Sunni to Shi`a Islam. Within each, one may trace a philosophical and political approach to governance, appraisals based on historical experience,

and juridical theories of the state. In Sunni juridical approaches to the state, a strong strain of idealism is expressed, and little attention is given to the political rights of the individual or civic rights. In this tradition, an ideal polity was described (*madinah fadhilah*) and as Nazih Ayubi has explained, “history was read into the *fiqh* [jurisprudence].” Muslims came to believe that this ideal condition had actually existed, when it had not.⁸⁴ Hence, even in classical thought, there is an admission that beings subject to human weakness – that is, beings who are not infallible – must govern.

It is commonly stated that “Islam is both religion (*din*) and state (*dawla*),” meaning that Islam comprises social, moral, economic, and political dimensions and is not simply a set of religious practices. That statement – that Islam is both religion and state – also emphasizes the responsibility of Muslim rulers to consider religion in their administration and provision of justice.

Under early modern thinkers like Abu al-`Ala al-Mawdudi, who founded the Jama`at e-Islami organization, the notion of *hakmiyyah* gained new importance. Mawdudi was confronting the power of nationalism as a political force and locus for identity, and he wrote that nationalism was exclusionary, whereas *shari`ah* – Islamic law – was inclusionary. The ideas of the early Muslim Brotherhood were indeed similar to his in this regard. However, the salafist Rashid al-Rida also argued **for** nationalism, and Muhammad Iqbal argued that Islam should not recede to the private sphere as in Europe, but instead achieve its own state in the Indian subcontinent – that being the basis for Pakistan.

The more problematic aspect of *hakmiyyah* is that as it justifies calling rulers un-Islamic, the rulers (and now, Western observers and policymakers) also

engage in and support the practice of *takfir* (see **T is for Takfir**) by demonizing their Muslim opponents. It is not clear exactly how many Muslims regard their own rulers or governments as being illegitimate, but the numbers are large.⁸⁵ Whether the rulers are seen as un-Islamic has not been systematically studied, but these are very likely large numbers that would imperil American policymakers' projects to impose more rather than less secularization of society and government. Most probably, however, few Muslims wish to install a Taliban-like alternative. In other words, a more Islamic political order is something that many people approve of, but not compulsion to religion nor punitive regimes.

When policymakers emphasize the "totalitarian nature" of regimes such as Iran or the strictness imposed by the *mutawa'in* (self-appointed religious police) of Saudi Arabia, they would do well to separate their descriptions from the core nature of Islam, or Muslims, while remembering that Muslims would regard a more thoroughly pious government—in the best sense—as a greater good.

H is for *Haram*.

Beyond the notion of sacred sanctuary and recourse discussed above under **Bast**, certain Muslims have encouraged the idea of the sanctity of lands where Muslim sacred spaces are located. It is not proper to attribute this solely to salafism, or Wahhabism; the more recent accusation that Westerners "violated" Saudi Arabia with their presence during the previous Gulf War had an effect. Usama bin Ladin has frequently used this idea to tie in with the corruption of Saudi Arabia's rulers and their alliance with the West, first

alluding to the Western troops in Saudi Arabia: “the presence of the troops of the Crusaders and the Jews who are profaning the holy places.”⁸⁶ To bin Ladin, the Muslim-only policy at Mecca and Medina extends to the entire country of Saudi Arabia, indeed to the entire Arabian peninsula. What policymakers should understand is that quite a number of other Muslims agree with bin Ladin’s views. For instance, many agreed that the Saudis should not aid a Western war against Muslims, that Western troops on the Arabian peninsula corrupted religious sanctity, and that by virtue of withdrawing the U.S. military presence to other Gulf nations, these views have been bolstered and must be addressed. Many also agree that too many Afghans and Iraqis have died in the American campaigns in their countries.

I is for *Ijtihad*.

Ijtihad is the eighth verbal form of *j-h-d*, (the root of *jihad*) and intensifies the root meaning of “striving” to a special process of creative reasoning. It is one of the sources of jurisprudence, or Islamic law-making, which was, historically, abandoned by Sunni jurists, though it remains a part of the Twelver Shi’i tradition. A cleric could be trained and certified in *ijtihad*, thus earning the rank of *mujtahid*. Modernist Muslims and liberals rather frequently call for *ijtihad*, or “a return to *ijtihad*” as a means of reform from within Islam. It is rather difficult to conceive of Sunni clerics and jurists *en masse* or individually resuming *ijtihad* when their training has not encompassed this principle, and when the reason for abandoning *ijtihad* was to avoid incorporating too much illicit innovation in the corpus of Islamic law. Still, there is always the possibility that

this might occur, and a few liberal Sunni Muslims definitely claim to be utilizing *ijtihad* in their opinions, or actions.

However, non-Muslims (or former Muslims like Hirsi Ali or Wafa Sultan) cannot engage in *ijtihad* for Muslims, and that is the apparent intent of many projects to make Muslims “less religious,” “less conservative,” and “more liberal” in connection with the GWOT. Further, those Muslims who approach the problem simplistically will encounter numerous objections to their efforts to innovate. For instance, Irshad Manji, a radical feminist lesbian of Pakistani origin, has established “Project Ijtihad.” Manji is intelligent and in touch with all universalist human rights arguments against conservative Islam, accepting the label of “Muslim refusenik,” but has, like many current spokespersons for liberalizing Islam, little knowledge of Islamic textual or legal tradition. She admits vitriolic Muslim resistance to her endeavor.⁸⁷

I is for the Internet.

The Internet has featured into recruitment, documentation, and military education of jihadists, but perhaps more so in the West than in the Muslim world. And it has aggrandized the effect and importance of jihadists beyond their numbers. The use of the Internet has attracted strong interest,⁸⁸ and it is clearly difficult to monitor or censor.

However, it might be useful to remember that across the Muslim world, the Internet might not be as important as other methods of communication and influence as has been suggested, or it may well be more important in terms of its public relations and “educational” value than in initial appeals to Muslims. The highest use of the Internet worldwide is among

those of higher incomes. Even in the United States, a huge segment of the population is essentially excluded from Internet use, or restricted to hours logging on in public libraries. Middle Eastern countries with higher Internet usage still have less access than other parts of the world, and there are no free Internet sites, as indeed, there are no free public libraries in most of these countries. University students may have access, but the costs of private Internet servers are prohibitive for many, as are business centers with Internet access by the hour, or portion thereof.

For every 1,000 people in Egypt, there are .028 computers with access to the Internet, as compared to the world average of 23.27 connected PCs for every 1,000 people,⁸⁹ and it is estimated that there are only about 3 million users in Egypt, out of nearly 80 million persons. Obviously the Internet, which only came into wider usage in Egypt in the late 1990s, was not the major means of recruitment in radical Islamism—for that began in the 1970s.

In addition to concerns about jihadi recruitment, strategic communicators see the blogosphere as a venue for attracting Muslims “to democracy.” These ideas about the Internet’s reach within the Muslim world might also be exaggerated. A survey of 350 Iranians undertaken by a Canadian post-graduate found that at least half the bloggers were exiles outside of Iran, and that the majority of bloggers were young, urban, well-educated, and computer literate.⁹⁰ All of this pertains more to the theme of regime-change in Iran, than to Islam; however, the main point in the West is to encourage a change by means of media and funding *away* from an Islamic state.

Illiteracy or functional illiteracy is another factor that excludes many from the Internet. In the Middle

East as a whole, about 10 percent appear to have use of the Internet as compared to 17.5 percent for the rest of the world. Many young men have been recruited to extremists groups via social networks. Places of worship — mosques, and masjids and sports clubs — are sometimes important, as are prisons. Social contact, not access to computers, is key after word of mouth, audio tapes, video as in the lurid recruiting tapes constructed by al-Qa'ida in Iraq, television, cell phone technology, and old-fashioned print have also spread jihadist thought.

I is for Iraq and Insurgency.

The battle in Iraq is a national, not a religious, one, but it has taken on a certain religious import to many Muslims. At the same time, President Bush suggests that Americans are facing the same terrorists in Iraq as those who were responsible for the destruction of the World Trade Center, and says that “If we fail in Iraq, the terrorists will follow us home” and poses Iraq as a battle primarily between al-Qa'ida and America.⁹¹ When President Bush offered new evidence that Zarqawi, the former leader of the al-Qa'ida organization in Iraq, was “tasked” to carry out violence outside Iraq, then Americans tend to believe the two al-Qa'idās were one and to overlook the more than 40 other insurgent or resistance organizations in Iraq. Muslims see this linkage to be a misleading and disingenuous claim.

The “insurgence” is routinely described as “resistance” (*muqawama*) whether by Islamist or liberal sources, and that is how it is viewed, inside and outside of Iraq. But that resistance is not entirely, or even primarily, being waged by violent Islamists. Al-Qa'ida fi Bilad al-Rafidhayn, the group once led

by Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi and then by al-Masri, is just one of more than 40 resistance organizations. The GWOT cannot, and should not, be superimposed on the war in Iraq. When it is, Muslims view American strategic messages as little more than propaganda. That assessment, by and large, excludes the Iraqi government and military forces who must, perforce, employ the Western terminology of “insurgents” and “insurgency,” although they simultaneously speak of “resistance” and strategize about “opposition.”

Intersectarian, fratricidal, or civil war in Iraq—whatever term you prefer—has a religious dimension, but is funded, once again, primarily by the grim prize of political power and territory, not by the aim to further Islam.

The symbols of the destruction of the previous regime, and Saddam Husayn, have created *fitna*, according to Muslims, and undone the basis for a nonsectarian Iraqi nationalism. The outlawing of the Ba`th Party and de-Baathification, the trial of Saddam Husayn, and his execution (and that of others on trial) were all extremely controversial with Muslims and Arabs. If the new order in Iraq stood for democracy, human rights, and against authoritarianism, then why were Husayn and his relatives and cohorts dealt with in the essentially barbaric and tribal fashion that Iraqis have witnessed following coups and corrective actions since 1958? If Saddam’s crimes were to be made clear and proven without a doubt to the Sunni population of Iraq, then perhaps the trial should have been held in an international forum (which might have blocked a death penalty), and he should not have been executed prior to the completion of the trial involving the slaughter of civilians in the 1988 Anfal campaign.⁹² In other words, the United States and the new Iraqi government might

have held to a higher standard of justice. Had that taken place (particularly with the Anfal evidence), more Iraqis and Arabs might have been convinced of the legitimacy of the execution.

People watched the televised trial of Saddam Husayn in the region although the American media showed little other than Saddam's supposed "arrogance" and "anger" – the traits of the Other – with little discussion of the legal merits of the case. Judges and attorneys were attacked, and the presiding judge dismissed for being too favorable to Saddam. The trial was divisive, but the *denouement* – Saddam's execution staged on the Feast of the Sacrifice, 'Id al-Adha, when customarily capital sentences are commuted, pardons are given, and prisoners are released – looked like revenge. This was heightened by his hanging rather than execution by firing squad; observers taunting him, and yelling "Muqtada, Muqtada," and then the botched hanging resulting in the beheading of former intelligence chief and Saddam's half-brother, Barzan Ibrahim, during his execution carried out on the same day that Awad Haman Bandar, the former head of Saddam's Revolutionary Court, was executed. *Al-Nahar* newspaper ran a cartoon with the caption "The New Iraq," showing the three nooses decorating the flag, shaped into the word, "Allah."⁹³ In other words, the Islamist (which happen to be Shi'a) forces of the New Iraq spelled the death knell of the Arabism (cruel and authoritarian as it was) of Saddam, and revenge – not justice – was the motivating force in this event.

And while the majority of Iraqis fighting in the resistance are not foreign fighters and not inimically wedded to a radical jihadist philosophy, the conflict has permitted that smaller segment of bona fide jihadists to sharpen popular antipathy to U.S. foreign

policy in the region. Moreover, those foreign fighters who did travel to Iraq are expected to make problems elsewhere in the region, if not in their home countries, if the conflict is contained, mediated, or eventually settled via negotiation.

Finally, we should register concern about the large numbers of detainees in Iraq, including nearly 30,000 at Camp Bucca, which runs counter “to the notion of winning over a population in a classic counterinsurgency” according to Major General Douglas Stone, under whose command the prisoners are separated into “radicals” wearing red jumpsuits and “reforming” wearing amber jumpsuits. There were riots at this facility in March and May 2007, the latter possibly involving 10,000.⁹⁴

I is for Islamofascism (see also p. 11).

Certain criticisms of this unfortunate term appeared above in the introduction to this monograph. Creating a pathology and slogan like “Islamofascism” may be useful, indeed, in mobilizing Americans or Europeans against Muslims or against Americans of different (realist) tendencies,⁹⁵ but it most definitely expands the “war” to ordinary believers who deeply resent the appellation. They will continue to protest the application of the fascist label to core elements of their religion. As Ralph Peters wrote regarding what he considered racist communications about Muslims, it is “discrediting honorable conservatism. How? By insisting that Islam can never reform, that the violent conquest and subjugation of unbelievers is the faith’s primary agenda—and, when you read between the lines, that all Muslims are evil and subhuman.”⁹⁶ Exasperating to Muslims are those comments which

connect Islamofacists, “America’s enemies,” with their aim for *shari`ah* – the Islamic legal system that all Muslims are to live under and support. In innumerable publications, the lack of distinction between Islam and violent Islamists, or lack of understanding of key aspects of Islamic thought or history, shows how difficult it is to develop a specific overarching approach to very different types of Islamist or simply Muslim groups.

Reading about Islamists and their ideas through secondary or tertiary sources leads to some unusual and untenable conclusions. An example is an identification of Islamofascism with something called “Qutbism.”⁹⁷ First, “Qutbism” is not an Arabic term, and *qutbiyya* would not be understood in the region or possibly confused with a concept essential to Sufism (the *quth*, or axis of the planet). Second, radicalism is not synonymous with the writings of Sayyid Qutb. Third, the expression lets other ideological contributors to radicalism off the hook.

Those who have written about the growth of militant Islamism in Egypt, like Emmanuel Sivan, Giles Kepel, and Fawaz Gerges (to mention three authors who very negatively describe this trend), usually mention that Sayyid Qutb indeed contributed to the vocabulary of violent Islamists with his final, dark work, *Ma`lim fi Tariq*, in reaction to suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the imprisonment, torture, hard labor, and, in some cases, executions of its members by the government of President Gamal abd al-Nasir of Egypt. Even more important than this piece of writing, was that Sayyid Qutb was executed by the Nasir regime and became a martyr.

Little else about Sayyid Qutb is explored in the contemporary descriptions of jihadism, and very few in the West have read Qutb’s other, far more important

books. To associate Sayyid Qutb solely with violent jihad, *takfir*, or martyrdom is to miss the majority of his message and how it was read and understood by Muslims of his time, or the fact that Qutb never called for a violent revolution in his country. Indeed, he rejected the West, not in complete ignorance, but after coming to visit the United States and Europe for a few years. One proponent of attacking the message and “messenger” of Qutbism, claims that “Many of Qutbism’s proponents are individuals with questionable religious credentials.”⁹⁸ Well, this may or may not be true if we are speaking of al-Qa’ida or related neo-salafist groups in Saudi Arabia or Yemen. Bin Ladin and Zawahiri generally refer to bona fide religious concepts. But, my point is that Sayyid Qutb possessed religious and philosophical credentials that should not be ignored.

To blame him for global jihad is a convenient way of discounting the impact of other salafists (from the Wahhabist sect), and further implying that the violent radical leaders who followed him read or understood his earlier proposal that an Islamic society could be created through a “social revolution” and education. It is also a significant way of discrediting the Muslim Brotherhood, who are, after all, the opposite of *takfirists* (see *Takfir*) and have been committed to gradual change for many decades now since their release from prison under President Anwar al-Sadat.

J is for *Jihad*.

According to Abdurahman Wahid, former President of Indonesia, Muslims must articulate the “right Islam” versus the “wrong Islam.” A subtle change in his prescription against extremist Islam may

be detected — “explain what Islam truly is to Muslims and non-Muslims alike.”⁹⁹ This latter task makes the clear differentiation of the “right” versus the “wrong” Islam much more difficult, especially when it comes to the historical role of jihad. The notion of an “extreme” or intensified version of a legitimate concept is perhaps more useful here than the notion of deviance and pathology.

Jihad is not simply an anachronistic command that Muslims can relinquish, or ignore, or reinterpret on their own. Nor can or should Muslims ignore the history of the early Muslim expansionary wars, which were, whether or not they should have been, justified through the doctrine of *jihad*. (A more acute understanding of the historical period would be helpful, one that that would nuance the idealized “virtue” of the *salaf* [ancestors] for instance, or acknowledge the synthesis of influences on Muslims, as well as for Westerners who rarely encounter any mention of Islamic history.) This classical “doctrine,” namely texts that commented on the proper ways to wage war and make truces, was primarily written in the second Islamic century. Simultaneous with these treatises by Muhammad al-Shaybani (d. 804)¹⁰⁰ and `Abd al-Rahman al-Awza`i (d. 774)¹⁰¹ *jihad* was already understood to mean a more general and encompassing “exertion” or “striving” to follow along on the path of Allah, and specified in some parts of the *Qur’an* to mean fighting against the unbelievers, fighting with Muslim “goods and lives.” (3:157-158, 169-172) Those who are killed will be rewarded in paradise. In legal texts that were part of the *siyar* (international law of Islam or law of nations) more emphasis on *jihad* as state warfare appears since this was underway to expand the lands under Muslim control. This was a collective duty, one to be headed by the appropriate Muslim authority.

However, *jihad* could also be an individual duty, either when someone was appointed by the Caliph to fight, or swore an oath to engage in combat, or if Muslims were attacked by the enemy, and in that case, it was obligatory for all Muslims. Many conditions attached to the fighting of *jihad*, and the fair treatment of enemy prisoners.¹⁰² Among extremist groups, these conditions and provisos are referred to, even in warped interpretations. The broader meaning of *jihad* continued on as well, and was reemphasized by certain Islamic modernists concerned by Muslim-Western conflict in the age of imperialism. As modern nation-states in the region developed, these naturally were expected by their subjects to resist foreign military ventures, colonialism, and the economic and cultural dominance of the West.

These nations were, by and large, unable to match the power of the West, and international conventions and peace treaties seemed, to Muslims, to uphold Western objectives of dividing the region. Muslim extremist groups therefore emphasized *jihad* as a “command” and revolutionary strategy – that military endeavor would provide a new form of brotherhood, replacing the secular nationalist networks of the political era earlier in the 20th century.

There is no point blaming all Wahhabists, or all Egyptian Islamists, or even al-Qa’ida, for the emphasis on *jihad* as warfare. However, certain key ideological positions—for instance that taken by Abd al-Salam Faraj, the Egyptian Islamist radical, in his pamphlet on *jihad*, *The Forgotten Duty*—have been very important. This work countered the modernist liberal idea that *jihad* was a duty, but need not take the form of warfare, and therefore was not equivalent with the *arkan*, or five pillars of Islam, according to the Sunni community.

Some sources stress the role of the next generation of *`ulama* and jihadists who have issued *fatwas* in support of militant Islam, and the legitimacy of suicide attacks.¹⁰³ Westerners unfamiliar with Islam could get the false impression that such *fatwas* have replaced all previous knowledge about *jihad*; that is not the case. That Muslims are asking questions about *jihad* exhibits their concerns and confusion about certain related issues and their desire to perform only lawful acts. The political situation of Muslims differs, causing them to be concerned with the status of their own territory (*dar al-harb* or *dar al-Islam*; non-Muslim governed countries and Muslim-governed countries have different legal requirements, or at least there is a vigorous debate about what *fiqh* [jurisprudence] pertains to Muslims in the West¹⁰⁴), and whether or not defensive *jihad* may be claimed, for example, in the case of Palestinians who live under occupation and lack control of their own property, movements, or presumably right to practice Islam.

Western writing about *jihad* falls into many different traps. The history of warfare in the name of *jihad* is used to “prove” the evil or bellicose nature of Islam, or some more enlightened writers see the parallel between the “just war” traditions in Christianity and Islam. As Muslim academic historian Abdullah al-Askar has observed, it is also important to consider that *jihad* might have been misinterpreted by Muslims as part of their history; granting their early battles an “existential religious character” thereafter imparted to all their other political and territorial struggles, which in his view is not congruent with the true meaning of *jihad*, but was certainly typical of the Middle Ages (in the West, as in the East). He also notes that according to the true definition of *jihad*, as struggle for Islam, “preemptive war for regime change is strictly forbidden.”¹⁰⁵

The TruthSpeak Foundation has proposed that contemporary Muslim terrorists should not be described as *jihadists*, nor their activity as *jihad*, because that term carries some legitimacy (for Muslims) and their actions are really nothing but criminal behavior. Although that is true, the Foundation wants their activity described as *hiraba*, a crime under Islam. This is a truly interventionist effort to manipulate discourse, and (a) it is not up to Westerners to define a crime under Islamic law of this nature, (b) the activities of the 9/11 bombers included, but surpassed *hiraba*, and (c) *irhab*, or terrorism—the existing term—is used too broadly within the Muslim world, sometimes to target political foes and Islamist opposition and not only against those committing acts of violence.

Muslims also disagree with the prescriptions offered with regard to *jihad* because defensive warfare to protect Muslim lives and Islam itself under certain conditions is considered to be justified. And in some cases, when Muslims preach the “greater *jihad*” — struggling to fulfill their *islam* — in place of the “lesser *jihad*” (fighting), they are attacked by Westerners who call this a cover-up for Islamofascism.

J is for Justice.

Justice, and in particular, social justice (*`adl*, and *`adala*), are required of Muslims in the moral and individual sense in dealings with one another and at the broader public level. Muslims and Islamists, radicals or moderates and ordinary people, all call for justice. It should be striven for as Muslims are told to live in a fair manner and with moderation or *wasat* (a middle ground¹⁰⁶), meaning that the use of extremism to impose sociopolitical justice would be wrong. The

main critique of Islamist opposition groups is that they do not obtain sufficient justice from their own governments, but also that ordinary people, most of whom are inadequately educated and poor, also suffer from injustice as the result of tyranny or despotic rule (*zulm*). To restore justice, Muslims want the *shari`ah*, Islamic law, to be implemented and that, in turn, must be utilized with justice. This contrasts with radicals who think that violence is the only means to secure real social and political change, even if they also are motivated to implement *shari`ah*.

A large number of Muslims perceive the American-led War on Terror as an attack on justice in the region, and that it is unjust to Muslims in: (1) the aspersions it casts on their faith, and (2) the Western political dominance it premises (as in the American presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Gulf) or assurances of hegemony sought by America in the region. Beyond their own lives, Muslims aspire to justice for all the oppressed in the world, and that is why appeals on the part of the Palestinians or Iraqis also carry weight with Muslims from distant locales.

However, many Americans who write about the war on terrorism make assumptions about the injustices committed by Muslims, or that they are not capable of justice, or that Islamic law, *shari`ah*, would not or cannot be just (as claimed by the members of the Jihad Awareness Project who have been lobbying the U.S. Congress and Senate to treat Islam as a new "holocaust").¹⁰⁷ To understand Muslim assertions of justice, it would be best to engage Muslim and non-Muslim opinions in a more interactive and non-didactic manner.

K is for Karbala.

The holy city of Karbala can represent a number of lessons for Muslims. Perhaps these may seem obscure to non-Muslims. Although these lessons emanate from Shi'i Islam, they may be meaningful to other Muslims as well. Karbala is not alone in this symbolic capacity; I have mentioned elsewhere that Najaf represents the revival of Iraqi Shi'ism.¹⁰⁸ In the post-Saddam era, Najaf may one day rival the influence of Iranian Islamic thought and education (due to the continuity of its clerical nuclei).

Additionally, Karbala invoked a revolutionary meaning according to `Ali Shariati (1937-79), one of the ideologues of the Islamic revolution in Iran who did not survive to see the challenges to his vision. He wrote that everywhere (or all battlefields) stood for Karbala, where Husayn was killed by Yazid's forces; and that every month was Moharram; and every day, Ashura; when that defeat occurred.¹⁰⁹ He also pointed out that Husayn left the rituals of the *hajj* in Mecca to battle the illegitimate Ummayyad ruler in Karbala; in other words, the observance of religious rituals is meaningless when the *ummah* has false leaders. "Evil is hiding itself behind the masks of holiness and righteousness," he wrote, and also that many people only understood the narrowest interpretation of historical figures, like Fatima, or Zaynab, or Husayn, in the context of occasions like Ashura. In "Fatima is Fatima," he explained that when a man struck himself in the Ashura ritual, or a woman cried for Zaynab and Fatima, yet neither one knew "one line of their words," nor "one line about their lives," this leads to the abandonment of Islam by the young.

And, thus, educated and open-minded boys and girls judge the situation and say, "What is the use of this religion? What can such a religion do? What knots do all this excitement, lamentation, and cries for Hussein, Fatima, and Zaynab untie for our backwards, imprisoned people who need awareness and commitment to negate oppression and to seek freedom.[?]"¹¹⁰

His answer is that the freedom-seeker who survives like Zaynab (and is not killed like Husayn) must understand the continuing meaning and import of religious symbols and not simply enact ritual. He implies that Karbala symbolizes the need for religion to matter in our modern world, and for leadership to be ready to sacrifice itself.

Now, where exactly does Karbala stand in light of the contemporary revival of Iraqi Shi'i rituals, at least public processions, in today's Iraq? Hopefully, it could symbolize something other than the murder and bombing of pilgrims and those observing religious ritual and the claiming of *jihad* and martyrdom exclusive to one sect or another, and instead stand for the struggle for responsible leadership of all types of Muslims within Iraq and outside in the broader Muslim world.

K is for the *Khawarij* (Kharijites).

Purist Muslim movements have arisen with some regularity. The Khawarij, or Kharijites, seceded from the dominant political order early in Muslim history. Some efforts have been made to use their legacy to explain extremism, militance, and suicide bombing.¹¹¹ They are linked with the history of the first *fitna*, or civil war, and the death of `Ali ibn Talib, the Prophet's son-in-law. Wrongly identified as Shi'a because of their initial support of `Ali, a Khariji actually killed `Ali

because he agreed to arbitration with the Ummayyad forces. Thereafter, they held the *ummah* could be led by any pious individual, whereas the Shi`a considered that leadership should proceed within the *ahl al-bayt*, or family of the Prophet until designated to others. The Kharijites reserved the right to rebel against leadership who departed from the Prophet and the first Caliph's example. They did not call themselves Kharijites, and their remaining descendents, the Ibadi Muslims, similarly reject this term, instead calling themselves the People of Justice and Straightforwardness.

This summary of the "real" or historical *khawarij* contrasts with Muslim governments' denunciations of radical Muslim groups where their appellation becomes a slogan for extremism. There is a more sophisticated critique of the Khawarij that focuses on methodology. Modern salafists critique Kharijites for their exclusive "fear" of Allah, Sufis who worship [wrongly] because they exclusively concentrate on love, and Murji`iyya, who were unconcerned with sin (and worshipped with hope). Each of these singular paths is wrong, according to *salafi* thought, because one must worship with the operative motivations of fear, hope, and love all together.¹¹²

Ultimately, identifying one group as being uncompromising or certainly less compromising than others with regard to the idea of "no ruler but God" (the *khawarij* slogan) is not very helpful, unless one believes that a firm delineation of "right Islam" and "wrong Islam" will, in fact, prevent factionalism, political or theological disputes, or violence.

K is for *Kufr*.

Kufr is the word for disbelief in Islam, or for idolatry, and literally means covering or obscuring

the truth. It is the opposite of Islam, and implies more than mere ignorance of religion or denial that Islam plays a role in all aspects of life, but also denial of the Prophets, mocking of the *Qur'an*, and those who reject all evidence (*ayat*) of Allah and the Day of Resurrection (as in the *Qur'an*, Surah 18:105). Beyond this, Muslims may actually dispute what is *kufir*, for instance, some hold that the visiting of graves of holy men and women, or circumambulating these sites is *kufir*. Many Muslims visit such sites for the purpose of requesting intercession or favors, or experiencing *baraka* (the transmission of the holy person's charisma, or blessedness).

Unfortunately, the eclectic nature of Islamic thought and the differences in interpretation expose Muslims engaging in reinterpretation or even historical analysis or other types of inquiry to charges of *kufir*. For example, Dr. Amina Wudud has been accused of *kufir* and inspiring *fitnah* (see *Fitna* above) for daring to lead Friday congregational prayer. The orthodox position is that a woman could lead prayers of a woman-only group, as women are restricted to that segregation. She cannot lead by going in front of a group of women, only by leading from the middle of the row. One orthodox school prohibits women from the Friday (group) prayer altogether. And they cannot possibly lead prayers of a mixed-gender congregation,¹¹³ essentially because of the "dominion" of the male over the female which is supported culturally.

Ordering Muslims to stop engaging in *takfir* (the act of calling another a *kuffar*, see below) is not so simple. That is why the Western directives to Muslims to moderate themselves or produce a newly reformist, enlightenment, or liberal Islam are greeted with skepticism by Muslims, especially intellectuals who have been arguing for reform for many years.

L is for Law (Islamic).

Western approaches to the war on terror and Iraq have castigated Islamic law, *shari`ah*, or Islamic “courts” in many instances as well as groups which either support Islamic law, aim to restore it, or wish to use it as a source of law alongside other civil laws.¹¹⁴ Some even take as their definition of Islamists, extremists, or radical U.S. enemies those who want to live under *shari`ah*, or “medieval,” or “traditional” Islamic law,¹¹⁵ not understanding that many Muslims do their best to observe *shari`ah* whether they live in the West, Saudi Arabia, or a country with a legal code like Tunisia's. They do so just as observant Jews try to follow the *halakha*. While there are some conflicts with other legal codes or material conditions, some issues, like avoiding pork, are not usually problematic. However, they may, under other circumstances, limit Muslims from otherwise available employment and justifiably cause a resort to dependence on their own community.

The nonconcordance of Islamic law with Western laws has been highlighted in a few instances. First, a lack of familiarity with Islamic law creates problems where Western family law court judges may permit attorneys to explain principles of Islamic law or custom to try to influence a ruling. In Canada, the Ontario Premier rejected former New Democratic Party (NDP) attorney general Marion Boyd's recommendation to form a Muslim tribunal (like its Catholic and Jewish-based tribunals) to settle matters of family law, and groups in Montreal and Ottawa protested.¹¹⁶ Many of the protesters were women, and there is quite a debate within the Muslim world about the ways that interpretations of *shari`ah* disadvantage women, and

whether or not the reforms contained in modern civil laws, for example in Turkey or Egypt, are Islamically-licit.

First, it is important to understand that *shari`ah* is not a single published source, or a “code” as the 9/11 Commission stated; much of it is not even codified. Muslims consider *shari`ah* to be God-given, but what they actually consulted is *fiqh*, or jurisprudence, which is written by human scholars. *Shari`ah*’s nonmonolithic nature makes it quite difficult to understand without specific training. It is, however, an ideal with the purpose of providing justice, balance, and restrictions that will prevent sin and injustice. Law should serve society, not imprison it; and lenience, conditions of doubt, and various historical examples used to be employed to provide broader interpretations of Islamic law.

Partly due to the Ottoman codification of Islamic law in the late 19th century, lawmaking and the legal process began to change from a unique process wherein oral tradition and Islamic education were part of its elucidation, to something much more cumbersome and less flexible. A long struggle ensued between “secularizers” and those in support of a more *shari`ah*-based legal structure, as in Turkey.¹¹⁷ This took place elsewhere in the Islamic world as well. In Yemen, the poorly-understood Islamic law was recodified by government bureaucrats, and various traditions were altered, leading to a state assumption of religious roles and cynicism¹¹⁸ about the push for modernization.

Other Western objections to *shari`ah* are connected to the war on terrorism and the severe penalties for certain crimes (the *hadd* penalties). Consider that violent Islamists use *shari`ah* to excuse or explain their actions. Here as well, it is the interpretation of *shari`ah*

that is key. These actors do not want to appear as if they are ignoring Islamic law, which categorically opposes suicide and opposes deliberate quests for martyrdom.

The severe punishments (*hadd*, or *hudud*) criticized in the West are for the most serious crimes. Inter-Muslim debate swirls around the fact that the pre-modern concepts of severe public punishment are said to have no place in the modern world; and while they may be inhumane, they cannot be said to be unjust if they are mentioned in the Qur'an. In fact, there are some differences between what is mentioned and historical precedent. One reformer in Switzerland, Tariq Ramadan, (mentioned above under **Europe**) has suggested a moratorium on these severe *hadd* punishments as an alternative to condemning either the Western or Muslim legal standards.¹¹⁹ He has been condemned by various Muslim authorities in response.

M is for Mahdism.

Part of the Cold War approach to Islam rests on a **New Orientalism** (described below). Here features or aspects of Muslim beliefs, traditions, and philosophies are essentialized so their non-Western, exotic, and dangerous possibilities are exaggerated. The other *takfirist* and epidemiological approaches try to respectively differentiate or contain the "bad Islam" from the good one. As much as some features of Islam can be dramatized and characterized as a threat, Muslims perceive and experience them quite differently. All three great monotheistic traditions have produced eschatology and millenarianism. Islamic millenarianism derives from passages in the Qur'an pertaining to the Last Day, from the simple warning "Lo! The Hour is surely coming, there is no doubt

thereof; yet most of mankind believe not" (*al-Mu'min*, XXI: 59), to numerous descriptions of the punishment of the evildoers and the reward for the believers. Special traditions circulate around the personage of the Mahdi, or Guided One, who will appear on earth, when Jesus returns before the Day of Judgment. At that time, Dajjal, the Deceiver or Antichrist, will also return. Although the Mahdi is not mentioned in the Qur'an, information about him is provided in the *hadith* (the secondary source of Islamic law) of al-Sijistani, Ibn Majah, and al-Tirmidhi, including his lineage dating back to the Prophet. Signs and trends will precede his arrival, and he will restore justice, ruling for 7 years. He will personally resemble the Prophet Muhammad and bear his name (Muhammad ibn Abdullah).

Numerous individuals have falsely claimed to be the Mahdi. Some have led jihad movements leading to speculations about various Muslim figures, for instance, Ayatollah Khomeini, or what might happen if Usama bin Ladin were declared the Mahdi.¹²⁰ Westerners have focused on Shi'i Mahdism in the last 2 years, in particular Shi'i beliefs about the Imam Mahdi, who will return to Earth and who represents all that is "good and just throughout human history"¹²¹ which has been a part of President Ahmadinejad's popular appeal. Leaving this aside for a moment, it is important to realize that the Mahdi, or Mahdism, has been a feature of Islamic belief continuously in the Sunni Muslim world as well. Various false Mahdis have been recognized or proclaimed themselves like the leader of the Almohad reform movement Muhammad ibn Tumart (d. 1130) or the first Fatimid Caliph in North Africa, Muhammad `Ubayd Allah (d. 934). Westerners might be aware of the anticolonial movement of Muhammad Ahmad al-Sayyid Abdullah who rose up against Turko-

Egyptian rule in the Sudan and captured Khartoum, killing British General Charles Gordon in 1885.¹²² More recently, on November 20, 1979, Juhayman al-`Utaybi led a take-over of the Great Mosque of Mecca, and his cousin, Muhammad al-Qahtani, claimed to be the Mahdi, shouting into the microphone, "The Mahdi and his men will seek protection in the Holy Mosque because they are persecuted everywhere until they have no protection save the Holy Mosque."¹²³ Thirty `ulama (clerics, see *`Ulama* below) of Saudi Arabia issued a fatwa allowing force against the group inside the Ka`ba which is a sacred space (*haram*) not normally to be violated with bloodshed and which had only been the site of violence twice earlier in its history.¹²⁴

However, since the vast majority of Muslims either manage to believe in their detailed eschatology and simultaneously in the requirements of quotidian existence or are primarily preoccupied with the latter, it might be a mistake to take the exotic personage of the Mahdi or other elements of the Muslim belief in the Last Day as a general sign of desperation and fanaticism. In other words, such beliefs need not provide a rationale for jihad, or for any fatalistic attitudes which might render nuclear or other military threats more serious than at present. Such an argument is akin to the idea that the president of a nuclear power cannot be a woman who might have estrogen-related mood swings.

President Ahmadinejad alludes to the Imam Mahdi and the many beliefs about his return. Critics mention that he redesigned the capital while he was mayor of Tehran with Imam Mahdi's return in mind, broadening the streets for his return.¹²⁵ These allusions could represent genuine belief or part of the President's populist appeal.¹²⁶ Ahmadinejad is not unique in employing these references, nor fanatic; the late `Ali

Shariati, an ideologist of the Revolution (mentioned above under **Karbala**) wrote a great deal about the symbolism of the period of waiting (*intizar*) for the Shi'i Twelfth Imam and how it should be transformed from a passive to an activist phase of existence and political struggle.¹²⁷

M is for Martyrdom.

Shahadah, or *istishhad* (martyrdom) is an important concept in the rationale of Islamist extremism, and it is also a revered idea for various other types of Muslims. Some aspects of martyrdom for Twelver Shi'i Muslims are not unlike those in Catholicism. Both Western and regionally-based thinkers would like to uncouple the reverence of martyrdom from contemporary suicide bombings. The explanations of this phenomenon vary depending on whether fanaticism or asymmetric conflict is being explained. Some security experts cite the Zealots or the medieval "Assassins," others date the politicized phenomenon only to the Tamil Tigers, and then sparked by the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon which produced the Islamic Resistance movement; in other words, actions with a nationalist motivation.

Following the increase in suicide attacks as part of the Second, or al-Aqsa Intifadha in 2001, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Shaykh `Abd al-`Aziz Abdullah Al-Shaykh, gave a newspaper interview containing a series of answers to 12 questions in which he denied the legitimacy of suicide attacks, saying they are not part of *jihad* and that airplane hijacking is "contrary to *shari`ah*."¹²⁸ This so-called "bomb *fatwa*" essentially denied that suicide attackers can be martyrs, and it was immediately countered and condemned by many figures including preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi

(see below), but supported by Yasir Arafat, Samir Qassim, Muhammad al-Hajj Nasir of Morocco, and others. The crux of the dispute was the import of Palestine and politics. The essential doctrinal issue is that the individual duty to perform jihad is activated when Islam is under attack, and when Muslims are imprisoned, attacked, lose their sovereignty, and are subjected to collective punishment and theft of their property. When facing the overwhelming force of the Israeli military or in response to the 1994 Hebron attacks by Baruch Goldman, suicide attacks (this was Hamas' rationale) were then justified as a last resort.¹²⁹ Arafat sought to control these attacks in order to prove the efficacy of the Palestinian Authority to the Israelis.

M is for the Moderates.

Various government or policy-oriented papers have argued that we are now witnessing "an internal struggle within Islam, pitting those who espouse a particular orthodoxy against those who seek a reformation of Islam,"¹³⁰ or between moderates and radicals. Do moderates always seek a reformation of Islam? Or do they identify in some ways with bin Ladin's anti-Americanism? Who are the moderates anyway?

"Strengthening the moderates" in the Muslim world has been a consistent policy slogan since 2001. One important study suggests that we build on the "success" of the West in the Cold War by creating a new breed of Muslims—the moderates we want instead of the moderates that we actually find in the region. Indeed, these will not be moderates, they are to be Muslim secularists who will promote policies and changes in Muslim societies that synchronize with U.S. goals and strategic communications.

Christiane Amanpour narrated a television series entitled “The War Within,” a segment of which was called “The Moderates Fight Back.”¹³¹ This particular focus on Muslims debating in Ireland made it evident to viewers that moderates are not radicals. However, moderates in Europe do not speak with one voice nor face the same issues as moderates in the heartlands of Islam.

Unfortunately, mainstream Muslims—or the majority of Muslims, large numbers of whom are Islamists—are far from the prevailing American definition of “moderate.” A person who follows the five pillars of Islam, celebrates Muslim holidays, attends a mosque, eschews alcohol and pork, wears Islamic dress or is bearded, and does not date is simply following basic principles. But in the post-9/11 environment and probably prior to it, such a person is treated as being “extreme” outside of the Muslim majority countries. There are expectations in the business, professional, governmental, and media environments that people will express the bland geniality and lack of emotion expected of the white, male, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant elite base. So Muslim commentators appear, or can easily be goaded into appearing, hysterical, argumentative, didactic, and “extreme.” Expectations that Muslims essentially be secularists, embrace our cultural values, not condemn Israel, or not support Palestinians, or enthusiastically back American foreign policy elsewhere in the Muslim world will be quite difficult to realize. A more literal sense of “moderation” might be helpful, rather than equating this category to all that is not Islamist, or secularist-assimilationist, as in numerous U.S. Government and think tank approaches.

Some experts and sources have for years defined moderates as “anti-Islamist” Muslims.¹³² Campus Watch, a project of the Middle East Forum, an American pro-Israel neoconservative think tank founded by Daniel Pipes, has vilified important Muslim thinkers and academic experts who are considered “moderate” by many regional experts and Muslim and non-Muslim academics. This has gone beyond Campus Watch’s McCarthyesque website to a book that castigates 101 prominent American academics, including those who are too defensive of Islam or alleged Islamists disguised as moderates.¹³³

We should consider the views of “mainstream” pious Muslims, not only those who have rejected Islam as the primary focus of their lives. Among these, we need to acknowledge that, at least in the Muslim world and today in increasing numbers in the West, Muslims want to retain their identity and, in some cases, serve as a positive voice for stricter observance of their faith. They may not fall into the camp who relegate their identity and faith to the private sphere.

This author has additionally tried to point to the presence of moderate Islamists, who like radicals and also many non-Islamist actors reject Western political dominance and interference, but opt for education and *da`wa* to promote their cause and not violence. Many do not wear ties, those symbols of the Western business world. In addition to these moderates are hundreds of thousands of other Muslims who, however, cannot possibly be termed Muslim liberals. Defining moderates as assimilationists who reject the *shari`ah* and other key aspects of religious identity, wear coats and ties, and embrace Israel is just too much to ask of the Muslim world today. Equating moderates with liberals and secularists, or insisting that the United States create them through our policies could be a costly mistake.

M is for Muslim Americans.

Muslim Americans are a diverse group including immigrants and descendents of immigrants, refugees, exiles, and workers who intend to return to their countries, and a large number of converts. They share many of the same challenges and opportunities as Muslims in Europe and of other immigrants to America, and are similarly concerned about the negative way that they as well as their religion, Islam, are perceived, and the potential for limitation of their civil and legal rights. But Muslims are not a unified minority; they are diverse in terms of national and ethnic origin, economic and educational achievement and political views; and they have immigrated to this country in four waves since the 1870s. Thus, they go about conceptualizing and enacting their identity in different ways.¹³⁴

The United States was established to provide religious freedom. Today, anti-immigrant sentiments are much stronger than in the past for economic reasons as well as fear of terrorism. An initial backlash against Arabs and Muslims affected Islamic schools, Muslim students in the United States,¹³⁵ and mosque communities all over the United States. One might expect the furor to die down, but mosque attendees were recently attacked in Bakersfield, California.¹³⁶ Tremendous resistance to the establishment of mosques, and investigations of Islamic schools, or even schools that include Arabic has been ongoing.¹³⁷ Clerics like Fawwaz Damrah and Rabih Haddad have been indicted for “terrorist connections” and ordered to be deported, and virtually all Muslim charities in the West have been investigated or closed (see **Zakat**). Some argue that a tremendous price in civil liberties has been paid through the racial

profiling inherent in the detentions and arrests of over 1,000 Arab and Muslim men and deportation orders for more than 6,000 charged with visa violations.¹³⁸ Even if readers disagree that these events have taken place or are inappropriate measures, they should note that the media in the Muslim world discusses the hostility to American Muslims and thirst for more deportations by figures like Martin Amis (author of "The Age of Horrorism").¹³⁹

Muslim Americans, like other immigrants, encountered the American notion that their attachment to traditional ways, their language, religion, food, customs, and culture would fade as they assimilated. To some degree, previous generations of immigrants did Anglicize their names and hid their origins in the business world; however, they retained their food and culture. Many indeed lost touch with their family language and their region, although some groups renewed their ties by reverse immigration or marriage in the "old country." More recent immigrants have tended to form nationally or ethnically-based mosque communities, and to rely on each other, maintaining cultural traits more distinctly.¹⁴⁰ Both the RAND study (above) and sociologist Yvonne Haddad mention the ideas of Islamist Ali Kettani of Morocco. Kettani recommends that Muslims maintain their own enclaves in the West, thus retaining control over their own and their children's identities.¹⁴¹ However, if they do, a variety of conflicts occur with "mainstream" American culture whether these pertain to women's dress, or in the immigrants' opinions of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, which has undergone certain changes from U.S. president to U.S. president.¹⁴²

Muslim Americans are often disappointed by the U.S. Government, for instance, due to its exceptionally

strong support of Israel or its decrival of the role of religion (rather than the politics of the Islamic Republic) in Iran, or its military attacks that killed many civilians in Somalia (2007), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003 to the present) and Libya (1986), and see little reflection of their views in either the Democratic or Republican parties. Whenever violence against Americans has occurred as a result of U.S. policies in the region—during the hostage crisis in Iran, the First Gulf War, and in the 9/11 attacks—there are repercussions for Muslim Americans (and occasionally Sikhs) whether looting, telephone threats, hate crimes, or most recently, as targets of investigations related to terrorism. Meanwhile, immigrant communities had been progressively more civic-minded and participatory in American politics, and, in fact, this was true for larger numbers of those active and involved in their mosques as compared to smaller numbers in political activist groups.¹⁴³

There is no space to explore all of the ways that American Muslims have been misinterpreted in the war of ideas, but a few items will suffice. First, some have referred to the ability of American Muslims to have important discussions—sometimes emerging through generational or community conflicts—about varying ways of interpreting Islam. Prior to 9/11, certain reforms were discussed in America, but some of these were swept away by the negative atmosphere following 9/11, and co-opted by limelight-seekers and in some cases, U.S. Government interests. One suggestion, that American Muslims could serve as an important example of the kind of “moderate Islam” that neoconservatives would like to develop, is probably a reflection of that exaggeration. It is true that in America Muslims have been more free to worship Islam as they wished (if they had the resources) than elsewhere, if we

are speaking of Sufi Islam which has been persecuted in Iran, or with the experimental women-led prayer services in New York which have drawn much ire from other more conservative Muslims. On the other hand, in many areas more sparsely populated by Muslims, people live with limited resources, cannot afford to pay imams and preachers, and religious education for children is limited. Mosques may be objects of suspicion or even a target of the surrounding community. Also, mosque communities splinter into new worship groups according to national origin, support for salafism, or more liberal or conservative views.

Muslim Americans often encounter accusations that, chiefly due to their political perspectives on the Muslim world or their country of origin, they are not “true Americans,” or are dangerous to other Americans. A Pew research survey found that while most Muslim Americans are assimilated and hold moderate views, fewer of them strongly denounce al-Qa’ida (58 percent) although only 1 percent have a positive view of the organization. But that is enough for some to sound an alarm because about 26 percent of young Muslims in this study stated that suicide terrorism is sometimes justified.¹⁴⁴ One probably needs to factor their orientation to the Israeli-Arab conflict into this issue, which the Pew survey does not directly address.

N is for the New Middle East.

The New Middle East is a political conception favored by those who aim to actually transform political realities, thereby lessening anti-Americanism, and supposedly, the sanctuary for terrorism. These have included not only neoconservatives but other

Americans as well. One proposed version of this New Middle East featured Iraq without Saddam and split into three states, a new Shi'a-dominated state in eastern Saudi Arabia, and an expanded Israel and Lebanon.¹⁴⁵ Beyond these territorial outlines, a political transformation is envisioned that would speed democratization (this is the version alluded to by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice)¹⁴⁶ and bolster pro-American groups in power elites in these countries. Unstated was the need to protect sources of oil, but that has been a constant feature of U.S. foreign policy.

My aim is to remind readers that the "New Middle East" is *not* the vision of those in the region, and particularly not those of certain regimes who rightly see the program as destabilizing. And it has affected Muslims who read the phrase in editorials and interpret it as a new phase of neocolonialism, one which is especially hostile to many Islamic symbols and institutions, particularly those that might unify Muslims in the various nation-states of the New Middle East.

O is for (New) Orientalism.

The latest form of Orientalism revives the themes of its predecessors. However, the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and Iraq renders the reduction of the East to tradition and the West to modernity a more cogent and immediate problem. Orientalism originally meant the study of the "Orient" or the non-West. The Middle East, Islam, the Islamic world, and the languages of the region were a part of this discipline. In *Orientalism* (1978) and *Culture and Imperialism* (1993), literary scholar Edward Said developed a critique of imperialism's (and neo-imperialism's) use and abuse

of Orientalist scholarship, and other cultural vehicles like novels (Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*) and operas (*Aida*) to portray the "East" as the deficient, exotic, and subordinate opposite of the West. Said explored some differences between English-language and French Orientalist scholarship, although not German and other national approaches, and his views on contemporary Orientalism and its relationship to politics have been very influential in post-colonial studies. Not so, however, in the military approach to regional studies where many aspects of neo-Orientalism are to be found.¹⁴⁷ These also remain in English-language fiction and cinema about the region. Bestsellers like Azar Nafisi's *Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books* (Random House, 2003), Khaled Hosseini's *The Kite Runner* (Riverhead Books, 2003), and Åsne Seierstad's *The Bookseller of Kabul* (Little, Brown, 2003) all offer the dichotomy of the modern West posed against a traditional, cruel, and backwards East.¹⁴⁸ The hybrid or polyglot, cosmopolitan, urbanized, technocratic face of the Muslim world is not as interesting to a readership socialized through (in the United States and Europe) an American Orientalism. (It should be mentioned that a countertrend, Occidentalism—an essentializing of the West—affects the Muslim world, but the West's stronger economic, political, military, and cultural status mean that there is a lack of symmetry to these trends.)

This New Orientalism pervades the current war of ideas. For one, the current proposals about "failing states" are riddled with New Orientalism. Also, this line of reasoning may be flawed. It is much more difficult to admit that other nations may be plagued with militant networks, not due to inherent and existentially constant ideas and also not due to their

backwards status in terms of development. They may be undeveloped or malfunctioning societies in which women are second-class citizens, according to these critics, but these conditions really do not lead to militant networks—they might be unconnected entirely with them. Thus Westernizing, modernizing, and democratizing—all part of “saving” the Muslim world from its own tradition—are part of this pre-existent political perspective towards that region.

P is for the Palestinians.

Is Palestine an Islamic issue with bearing on the GWOT? On the one hand, the aspirations and claims of Palestinians are essentially territorial and legal, even those pertaining to control over Muslim holy sites. On the other, state policies and political discourse both racialize and classify Muslim Palestinians on the basis of their religion. Many Israelis considered the Palestinian movement since its inception and throughout all of its phases to be inimically opposed to a Jewish state. That movement was not a religious movement in years past, but Israeli spokespersons now find it useful to assert that the conflict is a religious one, and Americans typically accept that argument.

Those Americans who are essentially unfamiliar with the history of the Palestinian population, and the destruction and devastation of their lives and society by the Israeli state, frequently accepted the definition of Palestinians as terrorists because Palestinian organizations’ acts of political violence, particularly in the 1970s crystallized their image in the Western media. This worsened following 9/11 when the Israeli media emphasized the parallels between the attacks in America and the ongoing suicide attacks that were a

part of the al-Aqsa Intifadha.¹⁴⁹ All of these perceptions lead some Americans to the conclusion that Hamas, whose popularity has increased in the Palestinian population ever since the Gulf War, and which entered into electoral activity winning elections in 2006,¹⁵⁰ can never be a partner in peace to Israel because of its Islamist orientation and commitment to resistance. (That the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO] had a similar commitment to resistance and was likewise illegal and excluded from negotiations for years is forgotten.) (Interestingly, there are many Israelis who diverge from their current government's position and have called for Hamas to be a partner in the peace process, including Amir Peretz when he was Defense Minister.¹⁵¹) Or arguments are made that all Muslims, or specific Muslim states like Iran, are united in their antipathy to Israel and support of Palestinians because of historical conflict with the Jewish tribes of Madina, Muslim claims to Jerusalem as a holy site, or due to the warlike (jihadist) nature of Islam itself. Finally, Muslim support of Palestinians is treated as an expression of their "extremism" (although in years past the focus was on "Arab extremism"). Muslim ambivalence, or refusal to call the Palestinians' national struggle "terrorism," considering the violence unleashed on them by the Israeli Defense Forces, is supposedly a marker of radicalism rather than moderation. However, this refusal is as marked among Jordanians and Egyptians, whose governments have peace treaties with Israel, as it is elsewhere. As the GWOT proceeds, Western voices (and Israeli centers in the West, like MEMRI) draw attention to preachers who invoke Palestine as a Muslim issue. This is probably going to continue until a peaceful and just solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is achieved.

Since Palestinians are predominantly Muslim, their struggle has some religious aspects. Specific areas or structures in Palestine were (and remain) *waqf* property, or endowments-in-perpetuity (mortmain) under Islamic law, places of worship, or the graves of religious figures which have been violated by Israeli administration, seizure, or even closure. Additionally, Jerusalem is the location of one of Islam's holiest places, the Haram al-Sharif complex, known as the Temple Mount to Israelis, which contains the Dome of the Rock (or the Mosque of `Umar), the al-Aqsa mosque, and various fountains and structures that were part of different endowments. It all lies directly on top of the ruined foundations of the Jewish Second Temple.¹⁵²

This area is not open to all Muslims for worship since Israel can and does close the entrances at will, and its control over Arab East Jerusalem can block movement of any traveler or visitor.¹⁵³ Of course, many Muslims cannot travel to Israel either because of Israeli restrictions, or the laws of their own countries, or the ongoing political boycott. But most importantly, Palestinians who are residents of the West Bank and Gaza cannot visit this holy site in Jerusalem or any other within the Green Line. Many other mosques, tombs, or graves are closed to entry even now, nearly 60 years since 1948, like the Great Mosque of Beersheva, built in 1906, converted into a museum, and then closed. When activists began to pray at the site in 1997, a member of the city council deposited bovine manure there. Larger cemeteries are subject to removal, one in Jerusalem is to provide a parking lot.

The Supreme Muslim Council provided some of the leadership of the pre-1948 national movement,¹⁵⁴ and the Israeli government tightly controlled "Muslim affairs" to prevent any such nationalism after 1948,

with Jewish Israelis assuming control of various *waqf* councils. Ironically, the Muslim Brotherhood,¹⁵⁵ which restricted its activities to Muslim education and social support developed in the religious vacuum that resulted from Israeli efforts to control religious issues, and Hamas was formed during the First Intifadha (uprising).

Muslim religious education has been a fraction of the Jewish education provided to the “minority education” system available to Arabs in Israeli public schools, and Jewish children received no education about Islam until reforms were made in 1994. These issues were the cornerstone arguments for the Islamic Movement¹⁵⁶ that arose within Israel. In the West Bank and Gaza, even more pressing matters of survival, curfews, collective punishment, and imprisonment have been accompanied by a growth in Islamist education and discourse. The Second, or al-Aqsa, Intifadha was sparked by religio-political sentiments when Ariel Sharon violated the space of the Haram al-Sharif with his visit with troops. Further, the argument is made that Muslims are not free to practice Islam when they are essentially under siege, children are being killed, homes are being bulldozed, more than 10,000 Palestinians are political prisoners, and that Palestinian lack of sovereignty implies a denial of human rights, which necessarily impinges on the religious framework.

Certain Islamists and Islamist organizations have typically stated that “Palestine is a *waqf* for Islam,” and therefore no group, or organization has the right to cede this property right, especially in return for a peace agreement that provides only a small percentage of land and, as yet, no sovereignty. This was one of the objections to the Oslo Accords.

However, the Palestinian dilemma could be solved territorially, and the Arab states have agreed that if UN Resolution 242 were honored and withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders were made, they would settle their grievance with Israel. Additionally, the status of Jerusalem, which many Muslims feel must be the capital of Palestine and open to all faiths for worship, and that of the refugees and other issues remain to be settled. Thus, the conflict is primarily national or territorial, but Palestinian society has always had a majority of very religious individuals, although its leadership has shifted, at least in part, from powerful families and clans to secularist-nationalist or Marxist-nationalist parties to a situation where Islamist organizations, nationalist parties, and clans compete. Tom Segev, an Israeli who supports peace and questions the wisdom of the 1967 conquest of the West Bank and Gaza in "What If Israel Had Turned Back?" concludes that peace is now far more difficult to forge because extremist Islamism is the "driving force" in Palestinian society. Palestinians and other Muslims see this as a red herring, perpetuating the "Otherness" of Palestinians, and therefore, the conflict.¹⁵⁷

P is for Preachers.

One focus of the war of ideas has been on Muslim preachers. These may or may not be prayer leaders (*imams*) or scholars (see **U is for `Ulama** below). The power of the preacher was amply demonstrated in the Islamic revolution in Iran when Ayatollah Khomeini's tapes were circulated worldwide. Audiotapes of *Qur'anic* reading/chanting (*tajwid*) are extremely popular, and so too are tapes of numerous other preachers. The sermon, or *khutba* creates a focus for

Muslim communities (at least for men) on Fridays, and on special holidays. During Ramadan and for the `Id festival following that month, preachers usually travel from the Muslim world to Europe and the United States to preach to mosque communities there.

However, one needs to beware of parallelism; the tradition and style of preachers in Christianity differ in important ways from the themes of Muslim speakers. Preachers may also be intellectuals speaking beyond a mosque audience like Tariq Ramadan in Switzerland. Popular televangelist Amr Khaled, who recommends religion “of the heart” and self-development, is not a trained cleric and wears a suit rather than Islamic dress. He is extremely popular with youth, speaking plainly on matters that concern them, recommending exercise, growing plants, and that the hijab is a requirement for women.

The even more popular and senior speaker Yusuf al-Qaradawi, whose fame grew with his weekly call-in program *al-Shari`a wa-l-Hayat* (Islamic Law and Life) on al-Jazeera television, is a cleric. Al-Qaradawi has been attacked in the war of ideas because of his background in the Muslim Brotherhood and his insistence that Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians is unjust. However, he continues to denounce terrorism and al-Qa’ida.¹⁵⁸ Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Husain Fadlallah, the foremost cleric associated with Hizbullah,¹⁵⁹ and the previous Shaykh al-Azhar, Muhammad Sayyid al-Tantawi, and in Pakistan, prominent cleric preacher Tahir al-Qadri also denounce terrorism and al-Qa’ida. Conferences have been held which denounced the practice of *takfir* (see below). Yet, Westerners frequently claim that Muslim clerics preach hate and have not denounced terrorism.¹⁶⁰

Muslim clerics or preachers vary greatly. Important systematic studies of the role of the preacher and his sermon have been written, and these show that preaching is a form of popular discourse in the Muslim world. For instance, in the sermons studied by Patrick Gaffney, two themes consistently arose: the role of *amn* (security) – owed by a government to its people – and *iman* (faith), as well as the omnipresent defining of an Islamic lifestyle.¹⁶¹ Using Western parameters of terms like “conservative” or “traditional”¹⁶² in describing preachers or clerics may not fit their approaches to modern issues. According to Richard Antoun, a principle aim of preachers is to promote modernity.¹⁶³

By no means are all popular preachers part of “political Islam,” although they may be Islamist. There is a new *da`wa* propagated by voices speaking outside the government as well as the political opposition, for instance in Egypt, the above-mentioned Amr Khaled, a religious entrepreneur who “makes Islam cool,”¹⁶⁴ Khaled el Guindy, Safwat Hegazi, Mahmud al-Masri, or al-Habib Ali. These star television preachers had secular educations and acquired their popularity at first through Islamic *salons*, meetings in private homes in the 1990s.¹⁶⁵ There are many more, including women like Magda Amer, a preacher who teaches courses on Islam and alternative medicine to well-to-do women in Heliopolis,¹⁶⁶ or Hagga Shirin Gouda al-Sahhar.

In the contemporary era, Muslim-governed nation-states have absorbed religious education and administration. They are responsible for and pay clerics who preach in many mosques. Thousands of other private masjids, or prayer sites, have their own unregistered clerics. Hence, one effort has been to register newer prayer communities, and this is far from complete. The preacher, however, has traditionally

possessed a range of freedom of expression that the government should not rein in, from an Islamic perspective. It is for this reason that neo-*salafis* like Salman al-Awda and `A'idh al-Qarni, who were among a group known as the Awakening Preachers in Saudi Arabia, gained currency with the population. A Muslim preacher may well gain his popularity from speaking in opposition to the government, or another government (like the United States or Israel) or to the West as a way of emphasizing or defining a more Islamic approach—which is often the core of a sermon. This “freedom of speech” function has also featured into the history of Shi`a Islam, particularly when it segued with nationalism.

One aspect of the war of ideas is to contain protest and freedom of speech within Islam from the oppositional perspective described above and yet cause it to propagate pro-Western and anti-traditional ideas. The consequences will be a further fissioning of the fabric of Muslim society. “Establishment Islam,” meaning government-approved clerics and bodies representing Islamic issues, are already identified with the state and considered apologists for it. Some reeducated preachers will probably be identified in this way, while others will maintain their independence.

Q is for the Qur'an.

As a response to the tragic events of 9/11, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill decided to assign its incoming freshmen and transfer students the book *Approaching the Qur'an: The Early Revelations* to spark discussion. Bill O'Reilly of Fox News said the assignment was like having students read Hitler's *Mein Kampf* in 1941. A conservative group sued the

university and in its website petition explained that this was “an obvious attempt to put a positive face on what many people believe to be a very evil religion.”¹⁶⁷ A federal judge upheld the University’s decision to assign the book. Surely the resistance to learning about Islam and the Qur’an has brought about numerous misrepresentations.

Lack of information or insufficient efforts to impart it are but one problem—DoD programs which typically provide some 3 hours of instruction on various aspects of Islam have no time to go into any detailed explanations of the Qur’an. On the other hand, numerous self-appointed experts on “jihadi ideology” now abound. Their literalist readings of the Qur’an (and of literalist Web postings of *jihadists*) are often inaccurate or incomplete. They are unaware of nuance and historical commentators on these verses. Moreover, they cannot explain the contradictions that the novice student of any religion encounters. How, for example, can verses supporting peace making and war co-exist in the same text? Even when the novice reads that some Muslims believe that the so-called “Sword Verses” abrogated earlier verses, they are unfamiliar with the degree to which the idea of abrogation holds water with Muslims. For instance, the greatest Qur’an interpreters have explained that the Book must be understood holistically, or literally, as a whole. Considering the Sword Verses definitive abrogations of other verses puts a lie to the various traditions that have interpreted jihad—not as warfighting, but struggle for the faith. In attacks on the American-based organization, the Council for American-Islamic Relations, it was claimed that this organization thus falsely represented “*jihad*” as “struggle for the faith.” Well, that is no more and no less than the way the

concept is usually taught, particularly in immigrant communities, as a simple means of differentiating the greater and the lesser *jihad*. As with any historic text, a guide and interpretation are extremely useful, as is the understanding that many subtly differing interpretations of the complementary source of law, the *ahadith*, co-exist.

S is for Secularism.

The neo-conservative message in the war of ideas is quite rigid in its insistence on “secular Islam.” This is somewhat paradoxical because President Bush has strong support from religious groups and as a devout person has made an effort to meet with devout Muslims. Further, many, possibly the majority, of Americans on both sides of the political divide are quite religious.

Sometimes the notion of secular Islam is fused with the idea of reform in Islam. In actual programs, these are to be carried out in events like the summit on “secular Islam” organized in January 2007 by Irshad Manji and which featured self-declared apostates, non-Muslim longtime opponents of Muslim political representation, and not a single religious specialist. The summit infuriated many long-standing Muslim organizations in the United States. Manji’s group denounced these community-based religious organizations as reactionaries or radicals. This event, in some ways, epitomizes the wrong direction in the war of ideas if any consensus is to be forged among Muslims.

Debates over secularism, or even about Muslim participation in secular political systems, have undergone some evolution. In an earlier era, Muslim figures like S. Abid Husain explained that Muslims

understood secularism to be an attitude that is devoid of religion or that countered religion.¹⁶⁸ As socialist ideas swept through the Middle East and the Muslim world and secular (national) legal systems developed, at no time has privatization or compartmentalization of religion gained acceptance as in the West. The word “secular” is so pejorative in the Arabic press or media of other Muslim countries that “liberal,” or “liberal trend,” or “modern,” have taken its place.

The emphasis on secularizing Islam is one failing of the previously mentioned RAND study. Let’s be very honest: all over the Muslim world, there are Muslims who are less observant than others and who may live alternative lifestyles, flouting or resisting either social or religious norms but not as publicly as they might in the West. Similarly, “Muslims have found it more convenient to circumvent, rather than to change, the [Islamic] law.”¹⁶⁹ Nevertheless, coercing elites or governments in the Muslim world to secularize or promote secularism is one issue, and living as Muslims in a “secular” Western society is another. It is true that Muslims can and do live as believers (not secularists) in secular Europe, as Olivier Roy points out.¹⁷⁰ But that does not mean that the Muslim world should or will become Europe or the United States.

Globalization is perceived in the Muslim world as one new current promoting secularism and attacking Islam. A very long time ago, I wrote a paper about Islamist resistance to the Big Mac world.¹⁷¹ This idea reverberates in the comments on globalization that Fauzi Najjar has collected—from Adil Husayn’s (Husayn is an important Islamist leader) ideas to others. Husayn expresses an antipathy to the establishment of a mono-culture, since the Qur’an explains that Allah has organized mankind into nations and tribes (49:13).

Another writer and thinker, Abd al-Wahhab al-Messiri, finds offensive the idea of a “small village” governed by a global set of values of “Coca Cola, MacDonald’s, and the like.” The cultural identity and authenticity of Muslims is clearly under the gun when all of the terms in globalization are culturally Western, as Dr. Muhammad Salim al-Awwa, the Secretary General of the International Union for Muslim Scholars, also points out.¹⁷²

S is for Sectarianism (see *Fitna* above).

Several points about sectarianism have already been made. In addition, the idea of political representation according to religious sect, as in the Lebanese “confessional” system, has spread to Iraq. While political representation is a desired good, *ta’ifiyya* (sectarianism) in Lebanon is its negative flip side and usually connotes prejudice, strife, and competition between groups or even discrimination.

One important Muslim view adopted by various radical Islamist groups today is that political party competition, even when not divided by sect, is also detrimental to the *ummah*. Here the reference is to *hizbiyya*, or partisanship, which was decried by the Prophet Muhammad in the idealized early era of Islam. A transition has been made by groups like Hamas, obviously, and Hizbullah to participate in national elections and accept party competition. Sectarianism is widely discussed in the regional press as an evil that festers within Muslim and Middle Eastern societies, and which was encouraged by colonial relations with particular minority groups. Thus it refers to British sponsoring of groups in Western Iran and the Baluchis, or to Iranian backing of Iraqi Kurds and dissidents in

the Gulf under the Shah of Iran, and does not refer solely to religion.

One can speak of a Muslim discourse on the sectarianism that is fostered by the West; more specifically by the United States in its plans for a New Middle East. In Friday sermons across Iraq, the U.S. Senate's proposal¹⁷³ to federalize and partition Iraq was criticized, for example by Shaykh Abd al-Mahdi al-Karbala'i, a spokesman for Grand Ayatullah `Ali Sistani, "The division plan is against Iraq's interests and against peace in a united Iraq."¹⁷⁴ That sectarianism is an evil that divides Muslims echoes in the sermons and statements of Sunni leaders and in mosques under Sistani's authority, where the Friday sermons have the power to reach numerous Iraqis with a coherent message. Sectarianism's evils featured in Lebanon in the mid-1980s, when Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah spoke, and also took various actions to allay Sunni fears of the poorer Shi'i groups who had then moved into West Beirut.¹⁷⁵

T is for *Takfir*.

Takfir is a method by which radicals or extremely devout Muslims declare other Muslims to be unbelievers, or those following *kufir* (above). Westerners as well as some Muslims eager to explain the events of 9/11 have correctly pointed to the intolerance of *takfir* and its use to delegitimize Muslim authorities, making them fair game. However, that is not all there is to "global *jihad*" – if indeed, there is such a separate phenomenon.

A debate on the sinfulness of Muslims took place in the Middle Ages, first regarding their status as compared to unbelievers, and second, whether or not

governments must compel their virtue. That debate has continued through Islamic history because it pertains to the nature of rightful political authority. In some areas, the government was expected to uphold *shari`ah*, but Muslims believed they had a duty to further enforce the *hisba*, or commanding the good and forbidding the evil. Radicals from groups like Takfir wa-l-Hijrah in Egypt, or Islamic Jihad, or al-Zawahiri and bin Ladin are professing the same principle as the *mutawa`in* or morals police of Saudi Arabia, but a difference hinges on the idea that ultimate violence may be used against the ruler who commits *takfir* (as with Sadat, who was accused of not upholding the *shari`ah*, opening the country economically, allying with the United States, and betraying his people by visiting Israel, according to his enemies). In other respects, “good Muslims” share many values with radicals, and, consequently, Westerners need to be very careful of employing simplistic definitions of their enemy.

T is for *Tawhid*.

Tawhid, or unicity, the oneness of Allah, is a master principle of Islam. The aversion to polytheism is a basic stepping block that has inspired Islamic art, literature, and devotional poetry, and also sparked controversy between Muslims about what constitutes “worship” of others (temporal authority, the tombs of holy men and women) than Allah. Some “warriors of ideas” ridicule the notion of submission to Allah—the very basis for Islam. Similarly, Muslim rituals are belittled, because the concept of *islam*—submission—is, in the West, popularly constructed as obedience, or slavish uniformity. When Muslims are portrayed on American television, in the news, or in documentary films, without

fail they are shown in prostration in prayer rows. Without any balancing coverage of diversity amongst Muslims, viewers sometimes understand the ordinary act of prayer to be fanaticism instead of a normal, simple, and fairly brief ritual. This view of conforming savages goes further. A few years ago, I took issue with a colleague who, in an attack on the slowness of reform in Saudi Arabia used the concept of *tawhid* to represent the forces against change,¹⁷⁶ contrasting it with the theme of accommodation, which is viewed more positively in the West. His response to me further addressed the way that Saudis, i.e., Wahhabis used *tawhid* (see below). Social scientists often examine the utility of concepts, and question whether or not their observations fit their criteria. For some years, those of us studying social change in the Middle East often described manipulation of norms, then resistance, accommodation, and flexibility. However useful universalist terms in the media or academe may not be what other societies see and express when they describe impulses toward change. Consequently, there is a gap between the types of changes that U.S. Government policy seeks and what is actually occurring on the ground.

One study circulated in the defense and policy-making community relates *tawhid*—a master principle in Islam according to Fazlur Rahman—to *takfir*, the deviant and questionable practice of extremists. In this case, it is not a matter of a universal or Western concept being applied in place of an indigenous one; *tawhid* has definitely been misinterpreted. According to this report, *tawhid* is used to “restore the purity of Islam,” “highlight moral decay of the West,” “restore honor of Muslim people,” and simultaneously oppose Shiites [one guesses in Saudi Arabia] and unite Muslims—

surely a terrible prospect. So we learn that *tawhid* is actually undermining “U.S. democracy and PRT efforts” and Western “soft power,” and that it uses *takfir* and threatens Western alliances with “secular Arab regimes,” (because they are not so secular after all, being Muslims who believe in *tawhid*). If the U.S.-led war of ideas continues to attack *tawhid* along with the concepts of *ummah* and *shari’ah*, other principles identified as “Islamist strategic framework,”¹⁷⁷ it will scandalize mainstream Muslims and convince them of American ignorance of and antipathy toward Islam.

T is for Torture.

Sexual degradation, the use of bright lights, sleep deprivation, waterboarding, lowered temperatures, psychological humiliation, and many other techniques used in interrogations, or the “breaking down of morale” described at Guantanamo are torture.¹⁷⁸ Muslims are angered by these practices, particularly when the United States claims moral authority and indeed superiority in imposing a rule of law. These practices have no place in a democratic American culture. Further, the destruction of tapes showing the interrogations of Abu Zubayda, a bin Ladin aide, and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, by the CIA, which was revealed in December 2007, gave the impression of a cover-up.¹⁷⁹

Saddam Husayn’s prisons practiced torture as do facilities in many Muslim countries, and this is completely against Islam. So, too, are all killings of innocents, whether foreign workers or employees, as is mistreatment of military prisoners. The incarceration of political prisoners all over the Middle East (and in Israel as well as Muslim countries) is held to be an

important security measure. No wonder that prisons continue to generate radicalism. Should the United States replicate such measures?

I have alluded above to a category of punishment in Islamic law which includes penalties considered to be torture by the UN Organisation Mondiale Contre La Torture. Knowledge, even if vague, of these *hadd* penalties does elicit criticism of the states using them, and, as earlier explained, some Muslims do think these should be suspended or reformed. The response by authorities, in Iran for example, is that the most severe penalties are less often employed now, implying that so as not to defy Islamic principles they cannot be outlawed, but could be used very judiciously. This view, to liberals, is unsatisfactory.

In other words, torture or inhumane punishment or treatment are unacceptable whether at the hands of non-Muslims or Muslims.

U is for the `Ulama.

Various figures of the religious establishment have already been mentioned in the sections on Education, Law, and Preachers. Nonetheless, an *`alim* (singular of *`ulama*) is more than a teacher or preacher, he is a scholar of Islam and may also be a trained jurist capable of issuing *ifta'* (one who issues *fatawa* [fatwas] is a mufti). One theme of the war of ideas is that the *`ulama* as the religious establishment should be blamed for conservative and radical views permeating Muslim society. Another thought is that Muslims could seize this moment of critique to reform or undo the *`ulama's* hold on religious authority.¹⁸⁰

The *`ulama* gradually developed, alongside the Islamic rulers who could also create laws, but by the

10th century A.D., they were the only authorities of Islamic law,¹⁸¹ and rulers were supposed to consult them. The *`ulama* held an elite status based not on wealth, but knowledge; however, they intermarried with the military elites and merchants. Critiques of Islamic social and political development allude to the traditionalism, or narrow intellectual replication of the *`ulama*, or to their use of hadith that might not have represented the spirit of Islam, although they might have been bona fide traditions. Be that as it may, the *`ulama* had a very important role in society until the age of imperialism and the development of modern states which subsumed them, in most cases, into public servants who were to manage Islamic issues and endowments. They lost their preeminent role in education as national school systems were founded. Modern laws eroded their power except in the areas of family law in most Muslim countries.

The war of ideas has thus far attacked the *`ulama* for not promoting the messages that the United States would like them to bear. But they have also empowered the *`ulama* in certain situations, for example in Iraq, by treating religious leaders as the most important sources of authority and useful partners. Similarly, the privileging of those who issue *fatawa* (fatwas) has to some degree silenced responses in the press, either from the radical Islamists or intellectuals unconstrained by the framework of the *`ulama*.¹⁸²

U is for the *Ummah*.

The *ummah* is the Muslim community. In the ideal, it should be united, as was the early settlement in Madina. Speaking about, having loyalty to, or addressing the *ummah* should not be a sign of terrorism or radicalism

as in the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis report on radical Islamist ideologies.¹⁸³ Attacking such a concept, or seeing in it the basis of a radical quest for a new Caliphate, is a serious miscalculation in the war of ideas. Also, assuming that Muslim unity is solely the goal or strategy of extreme radicals is also ahistorical and false. Perhaps the attack on the concept of the *ummah* is meant to erode one theme of Saudi Arabia's leadership in the Islamic world. Or the war of ideas may aim to devalue the conception of an Islamic world entirely.

Also, as with Arab unity, the notion and quest for Muslim unity is very idealistic, and not always implementable. That is true for other religions as well. In any case, policymakers are not attacking Christians who speak of Christendom, or the Catholic community, or Jews addressing world Jewry.

One can simultaneously operate as a member of a religious community and a national community, just as one may identify as an ethnic subcommunity within a national community. Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued for the tolerance of different religions so long as "their dogmas contain nothing contrary to the duties of citizenship."¹⁸⁴ His notion of a civil religion was expanded into a defense of nation and, indeed, politics, as the primordial loyalty, which a religion like Islam could not help but challenge. Most Muslims, however, do not believe that their faith endangers their loyalty to their own nation-states, and it is unlikely that new Western fundamentalists (of freedom or Rousseau's civic religion) will convince them.

V is for the Veil.

In the West, the word “veil” represents Muslim women’s dress and additionally the exotic hidden woman beneath it who is presumed to have low status and to be “submissive.” Muslim men and women are aware of this stereotype, and debate the need to veil in the modern world, and the type of covering to be worn. Part of the debate is dependent on the practices, laws, or customs of specific areas, and some countries may impose veiling on women as in today’s Iran or Saudi Arabia. In other countries, a lesser proportion of women voluntarily veiled about 30 years ago than today (as in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, and Tunisia).

In addition to traditional forms of veiling such as the Iranian *chador*, or the Saudi *abaya*, Islamists have promoted a modern head-covering, either a scarf or a *khimar* (a longer head-covering that covers the neck and shoulders) and clothing that conceals the figure. The entire outfit is referred to as Islamic dress (*ziyy Islami*), or *hijab*, and while the women linked to the Muslim Brotherhood wore this garb earlier, it appeared more widely in the region in the early 1970s, becoming ever more popular until today. When the *hijab* (as headscarf) was banned in France on February 10, 2004, by the National Assembly and came into force in September, many Muslims were outraged as large numbers had demonstrated against the bill. Feminists were divided on the issue. A few like Fadela Amara and Khalida Messoudi supported the ban although it can limit girls’ access to education. In demonstrations women proclaimed their French identity and also that they were wearing the veil by choice.¹⁸⁵ The issue is not entirely framed by a battle in Western Europe, since Turkish and Tunisian women were ordered to remove

the headscarf in public sector jobs since the 1980s, and some mounted legal challenges.

As more and more women adopted *hijab*, the position that it is an individual requirement (*fard*) of Muslim women also became more widespread. It has become more difficult for unveiled women to move in public space now taken over by so many wearing *hijab*. (This is the opposite in the West, where wearing the *hijab* is thought unacceptable in some environments, and where *hijab*-wearers may not be hired). At the same time, a more stringent style of Islamic dress has become more prevalent. In addition to a head-covering and loose clothing, or *abaya* (a full body cover worn outdoors, or *manteau*), some women wear the *niqab* which covers the face, along with gloves.¹⁸⁶ This more extreme style of veiling is quite popular in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. It is this form of veil that Jack Straw, Lord High Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, wanted Muslim women in Britain to remove when meeting with him, and which former Prime Minister Tony Blair called “a mark of separation.”¹⁸⁷

Naturally, the *hijab* and the *niqab* carry additional implications in different political environments. In Israel, the *hijab* can mark out Palestinian as well as Muslim identity. The *niqab* signals both more piety, or in some cases as in Saudi Arabia, just more conformity. The wearer could be a Muslim conservative—or not. In post-July 7, 2005 (7/7) Britain, tolerance of Muslim “difference” appeared to be wearing thin. Instead of a woman’s individual choice, Westerners and some Muslims attribute “antagonism” to the *niqab*.¹⁸⁸ My point is simply that many Muslims feel it should not be up to Westerners to say what they can or cannot wear, and that the current campaign against veiling in the West is a part of the war on Islam.¹⁸⁹

V is for Violence.

Another problem in the war of ideas is the association of all Muslims with violence.¹⁹⁰ Hal Lindsey expresses a typical rant against the violence of Muslims,¹⁹¹ a theme that Edward Said explained in *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*.¹⁹² Every media-conjured stereotype of fanatic radicals ready for death appears in official discussions about martyrdom and other Muslim beliefs. (See also **Strategic Messages about Violent Muslims** above.) I am not suggesting that the horrendous crimes of 9/11 and the other bombings and beheadings committed by Muslims in Iraq can be overlooked. However, we need to separate the actors and their motivations and actions from others of their own religious background in a clear-headed manner. Televangelist Pat Robertson has made many egregious remarks about Muslims. Because of his popularity, Muslims were able to hear him denounce their religion as a “Christian heresy”¹⁹³ that “teaches violence”; is spread by “the gun, by the fire, by the bayonet, and the torch”; while their Prophet is an “absolute wild-eyed fanatic, robber, and brigand.”¹⁹⁴

Karen Armstrong, a former nun and author of books on comparative religion, has refused to describe Islam as a violent religion despite what she saw as the violent acts of individuals motivated by politics. Further, she, like many Muslim authorities, was unhappy with the term “Islamic terrorism”¹⁹⁵ and instead described an intra-Muslim struggle that had reached a stage where Muslims felt obstructed by American foreign policy. All three monotheistic faiths—Christianity, Islam, and Judaism—have expressed violent and peaceful

intentions towards others in the world at different times.¹⁹⁶

What is important here is to realize that violence is not a manifestation of belief nor a natural outcome of Islamism or “fundamentalism,” but rather a tactic, labeled with the religious principle of jihad, that is intended to build an ethos, a camaraderie, and dependency on others engaging in violence. The way that extremist Muslim groups insist on militant jihad, actual warfighting, is quite similar, Sarah Zabel points out, to the *focoism* of Che Guevara’s efforts in the Congo and Bolivia, wherein a military unit, a *foco*, inspires the general population to join its attacks on a government.¹⁹⁷

W is for Wahhabism.

The views of Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhab, a religious reformist, an ally of the Saudi family in the 18th century, and his students, along with the Hanbali school of Islamic law, have shaped Islam in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism, as one variant of salafism, is frequently accused of being the source of extremist thought. It would be foolish, however, and impractical to propose the eradication of Wahhabi thought. It is equally odd to dismiss it altogether and lay the blame for Usama bin Ladin’s ideas solely at the feet of Sayyid Qutb who never preached radical violence, although acknowledging the conflict between the state and the Islamic movement in Egypt of his era. Wahhabism encompasses supporters and detractors of the Saudi regime, as well as something observers have labeled neo-Wahhabism. Generally, it is characterized by a felicity to *tawhid* (unicity or oneness of God, sometimes translated as monotheism); an abhorrence of *shirk*, polytheism, or assigning worship to any other than

God; and avoidance or questioning of *bid`a*, unlawful innovations. The early Wahhabis condemned the Ottoman rulers for their corruption, addiction to luxury, use of prayer beads, and other innovations. Wahhabism served as a mobilizing philosophy for the alliance between the House of Sa`ud and the House of Shaykh (the family of Muhammad abd al-Wahhab) in battles against the Ottomans, and then later for the Sa`udi's battles against other enemies during the establishment of the modern state earlier in the 20th century.

Wahhabism promotes *da`wa*, or spreading the message of Islam, meaning a more evangelistic approach. And Saudi Arabia pursued a foreign and cultural policy of *da`wa*, or Islamic mission, and is a leader in the Islamic world and of Islamic organizations like the Muslim World League, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, to which the United States will send a representative as announced by Karen Hughes. Saudi Arabia leads a host of other Islamic groups, banks, and federations.¹⁹⁸

A newer and more ardently *salafi* movement arose and has challenged the Saudi government. Some elements of this movement have agreed to work peacefully for reform. Others, like the militant al-Qa`ida fi Jazirat al-`Arabiyya, directly confronted the government and launched attacks since 2003. The government reined in financial outlets that were reportedly sponsoring terrorism—specifically al-Qa`ida—and began an antiterrorism campaign alongside its counterterrorist measures.

One aspect of that campaign involves reclaiming the hearts and minds of prisoners through corrective reeducation and rehabilitation, through a counseling

program built on religious debate as well as psychological counseling.¹⁹⁹ Support of prisoners' families and upon release is provided to allay the radicalization process. As with a somewhat similar program in Yemen, the idea here is to employ rather than ignore the state's Islamic resources, and explain deviance as a consequence of miseducation or lack of Islamic education. A high success rate is claimed, but this program, like the Islamic education now being provided to juveniles incarcerated in Iraq, probably should be assessed by following the released individuals for some years.

W is for Women.

In the war of ideas, Muslim women are described as a key constituency for democratization of the region. Under democracy, it is believed women will achieve their rights and therefore support governments that grant them and even push for secularism. Islam is construed as the force that prevents women (and all of society) from achieving their potential. This rosy prospect is not shared by many Muslim feminists who know very well that they represent a minority and joke about not being able to use the "f" (feminist) word.

It is absolutely correct that many inequities exist for women in the Muslim world, as they do all over the globe. Certain features of unfairness and discrimination come from cultural practices or interpretations of Islam; others do in fact derive from differential treatment to be found in *shari`ah*, and still others from the amalgam of *shari`ah* with civil codes that lend greater power to husbands (as compared to other male relatives).²⁰⁰ All of these sources lead to too lenient punishments, or exoneration for men who commit honor crimes against their female relatives.²⁰¹

However, small minorities cannot impose their agenda on societies. Women have most definitely moved into the public sphere all over the Muslim world with the establishment of national educational systems and due to economic factors. They could not do so without backlash, which has occurred in the last quarter of the 20th century, along with important advances for women sponsored by government leaders.

The already active women's movements in the region are also well aware of the growth of Islamist movements and their counterpart women's organizations. On some issues, they can cooperate with these groups. In other cases, they are deeply divided from them on specific issues, as has occurred between Palestinian women's movements and "Islamic women's movements"²⁰² and women supporting civil family law versus Islamic law in Iraq. Women's rights advocates, especially those with foreign support, are easily undermined by charges of un-Islamic appearance, perspective, and objectives, and external reports are accused of attacking Islamic societies.

Advancing women's interests is a key plank in the U.S. State Department's plan for promoting democratization, and women's rights are claimed as well by the advocates of secularized moderate Muslims, who state that:

the issue of women's rights is a major battleground in the war of ideas within Islam, and women's rights advocates operate in a very adverse environment. Promotion of gender equality is a critical component of any project to empower moderate Muslims.²⁰³

One thing to remember is that Islamists, not the Taliban but those of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hizbullah, also support women's rights and have

expanded their view of women's roles to include them on political lists. Non-Islamist women's rights advocates, however, fear extremists and are ambivalent about moderate Islamists. Furthermore, some men of their own background, and conservatives and other nonradicals, are also opposed to women's rights. Taking on this aspect of the region's culture wars is going to be a difficult prospect. Muslim women's rights advocates urged the United States not to recognize the Taliban. However, they have no wish to be seen as the lackeys of anti-Muslim imperialism.

Z is for Zakat.

Zakat is a pillar, or a basic requirement of Muslims, who should give 2 1/2 percent of their wealth and assets to the needy or to support Islam and Islamic education. Tithing and charity are practiced in other religions as well. What is important here is that with the War on Terror came an attack on many Islamic charitable associations, both those somehow linked to al-Qa'ida and to organizations that most Muslims regard as nationalist and more moderate like Hamas. Hamas, in particular, issued an appeal to reoperate its charitable groups since the local population is dependent on these services and they are not replaced by anything the Israelis or Fatah offers. They agreed to any measures of transparency and accountability, and warned that increasing popular desperation would not turn the population against them, but rather against Israel, the United States, and Mahmud Abbas. In addition, other Muslim charitable organizations which had no connection to al-Qa'ida whatsoever, or unsupportable connections to militant activities, were also targeted by U.S. officials.

It is questionable to assume that if the West can put Islamic charities or charitable giving out of business, terrorists will not obtain funding. Some of the typical practices of leaving *zakat* in open mosques, including food coupons in Saudi Arabia for example, led to their use by militants. But the principle of anonymous and informal giving had benefited the poor.

Muslim benevolence, philanthropy, and small-scale giving is an important aspect of a Muslim lifestyle. It should not be tainted indefinitely by suspicions that Muslims cannot manage their own endeavors.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

These thoughts on wrong approaches in the war of ideas are by no means comprehensive. I could have included others that circulate in the defense community like the false and misleading idea that Muslims believe in predestination (some may, but it is not a tenet of Islam) and are therefore fatalists, thereby ignoring the entire discourse on human will and responsibility in Islam. In mentioning so many wrong readings of Islam, my recommendations are primarily that we need to revise our way of thinking about Muslims, their ideas, and the movements operative today in their societies. To be more specific:

1. It is time to abandon the assumptions of a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West, which are funding a well-meant but arrogant and misconceived program for rehabilitation of the Islamic world based on the idea that the West knows best. Policymakers should rethink the wisdom of a U.S. policy that aims to alter a world religion, Islam, so as to produce an ideological current favorable to U.S. interests in territories of the Muslim world. Surely, the intent of this program is

geostrategic advantage and not reform of Islam for its own sake. The program could backfire, or simply fail, but as it stands, it is not difficult to understand Muslim resentment against it.

2. It is time to directly engage ordinary Muslims, their leaders, their clerics, and their intellectuals, and listen to their ideas about the appropriate pursuit of terrorism and the ways that ideological problems like the linkage between jihad and martyrdom can and should be addressed.

3. It is inappropriate to look to Muslims in diaspora—in Europe, or the United States—as substitutes or models for Muslims in their own home countries. Diffused Islam or assimilated Muslims are not the answer for the Muslim world.

4. Likewise, each country must develop its own model of development; about which populations, civil society actors, and governments will necessarily differ. Importing Indonesian or Turkish Islam to Arab states would reverse the historical emulation of the Arab heartland of Islam, but it makes little sense if what is desired is lasting social and ideological change. Further, inter-Muslim activities could be beneficial, and need not threaten the West.

5. Precision is badly needed. The analysis of actors and groups connected with 9/11 is still inaccurate. If we are to have bona fide counterterrorist and antiterrorist programs, they must be rooted in precision and attention to the context of each and every event, actor, and recommendation.

6. Where particular issues have been identified, it is important to proceed moderately with antiterrorist measures, and acknowledge issues of sovereignty. Do not resort to simple binarism or destroying institutions that have intrinsic value, as in equating certain *madrasahs* that produced *jihadist* fever with all *madrasahs*.

7. Acknowledge Islam as a sister religion to Christianity and Judaism instead of extending the “clash of civilizations” thesis to a “clash of religions.” This includes the acknowledgment by Muslims that their God is the God of Christians and Jews.

8. Policymakers should become more knowledgeable about the “red lines” that have developed in Muslim theology and practice so as not to tar moderating Muslims with the brush of apostasy or confuse “free speech” with an attack on basic religious principles.

9. Planners and policymakers should avoid essentialist and reductionist interpretations of key concepts like the Caliphate. In particular, they should not describe an idealized form of political rule as the ultimate danger to the West. They should discard the assumption of a zero-sum world in which Muslim unity spells Western defeat, or Western success rests on the division and disunity of Muslims.

10. Support democratization in the region but be attentive to indigenous ideas that would bolster democracy and stop treating Islam or Islamic movements as if they are intrinsically antidemocratic.

11. Observe the rule of law and humanitarian principles, and do not stoop to torture or the illegal scrutiny and observation of citizens and immigrants as if there were no meaning to the term “the free world.”

12. Relinquish the term “Islamofascism.” Instead, endeavor to build alliances with Muslims—and not only with their governments—in the struggle against terrorism. Avoid “long war” and “World War IV” contentions.

13. Endeavor to understand how Muslims observe Islamic law and the idea that Allah is the sole sovereign in their daily life, in the Muslim world and the West, while abiding by laws of the land.

14. Where Americans have come to control Islamic messages, for instance in prisons in Iraq and in the media in the West (but also to some degree in Iraq), they should beware of missionary zeal or propagandizing as is essential in all broadly addressed strategic communications.

15. The strategic communications and policy efforts underway that aim to bolster and expand secularism in the Muslim world are at odds with historical and social development in the region. The United States (even along with Europe) cannot undo the Islamic awakening, the growth of Islamist movements and principles, and popular support for them. Work with Islamists instead of engaging them in what surely will be a very long war.

16. U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and the Islamic world is riddled with contradictions. Even if these could be better rationalized, insofar as American policies are perceived to be unjust, to support neocolonialism, to include detrimental aspects of globalization, and to attack Islamic values while promoting American commercial interests and a long-term U.S. military presence in the region, they will be opposed in the region. Working to solve the Israeli-Arab conflict and supporting more effective (not just stronger) nations built on popular consensus that are engaged in democratization is essential. However, the United States cannot run the show nor even exert credible influence unless its recommendations make sense and promote cooperation between political and ideological rivals in the region.

ENDNOTES

1. Tom Peter, "National Intelligence Estimate: Al Qaeda Stronger and a Threat to U.S. Homeland," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 19, 2007.

2. Bruce Riedel, "Al Qaeda Strikes Back," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2007, p. 24.

3. Numerous responses were collected by Charles Kurtzman, and other collections of responses can be found on his web page, www.unc.edu/~kurtzman/terror.htm.

4. Pew Global Attitudes Project, "Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics," July 14, 2005.

5. Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, London: Routledge, 1994.

6. Carl W. Ernst, *Following Muhammad: Rethinking Islam in the Contemporary World*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003, p. 133.

7. I have criticized the following report several times in this monograph, Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Bernard, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Peter Sickle, *Building Moderate Muslim Networks*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007. In addition, one must look carefully at statements of and about the U.S. Government's Muslim World Outreach Program.

8. Personal experience and communications from and lecture by Amal Rassam, senior anthropologist professor emerita at City University of New York (CUNY), who served under the Bremer administration heading the neighborhood teams, to the Second Annual Conference on Iraq, "Identity, Cohesion, and Conflict in Democratic Iraq," Washington DC, Office of Iraq Analysis, March 15-16, 2006.

9. "In the President's Words: Respecting Islam," The President's Quotes on Islam, Washington, DC: The White House, www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/ramadan/islam.html. Notice the many repetitions of the idea that the United States does not fight Islam, but rather "evil," thus casting the conflict in moral terms.

10. *Ibid.*, From remarks on U.S. Humanitarian Aid to Afghanistan.

11. "President Discusses Global War on Terror," Capitol Hilton Hotel, September 6, 2006, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060905-4.html.

12. CNN and Fox News, coverage and commentary on the failed Haymarket bombing and terror attempt in Glasgow, Scotland, on July 5-6, 2007.

13. Many examples could be provided such as Judy Barsalou, "Islamic Extremists: How Do They Mobilize Support?" in Lynne L. Snowden and Bradley C. Whitsel, eds., *Terrorism: Research, Readings, and Realities*, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2005, p. 148.

14. Some continued to use the term for different reasons: as a way of comparing Jewish, Hindu, Christian, and other fundamentalisms with the Muslim variety; or because they did not understand the objection raised to the term, that the analogy made to the Fundamentals in Christianity is false, as the basic, not reformed, principles of Islam were being indicted, etc.

15. Dale Eikmeier, "How to Beat the Global Islamist Insurgency," *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. XII, No. 1, Winter 2005, www.meforum.org/article/689.

16. George Lichtheim, "The Concept of Ideology," *History and Theory*, 1965, p. 164.

17. As'ad AbuKhalil, *Bin Laden, Islam and America's New "War on Terrorism"*, New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003, p. 19. The term is from Maxime Rodinson, *Le fascination de l'Islame* (The Fascination of Islam) Paris: La Decouverte, 1989.

18. Ali S. Asani, "Allah at Harvard," in Steven Barboza, ed., *American Jihad: Islam After Malcolm X*, New York: Doubleday, 1993, p. 37.

19. Norvell B. De Atkins, "Islam, Islamism, and Terrorism," *Army*, January 2006, p. 57.

20. One example is Christopher Henzel, "The Origins of al-Qaeda's Ideology: Implications for U.S. Strategy," *Parameters*, Vol. XXXV, No. 1, Spring 2005, pp. 70-72.

21. Lara Deeb, "Louder than Bombs," *Middle East Report*, Vol. 242, Spring 2007, pp. 18-19; Daniel Drennan, "Brand America: Of False Promises and Snake Oil," at AIGA, January 30, 2007; and *Electronic Lebanon*, February 7, 2007.

22. As in Dore Gold *et al.*, "Iran, Hizbullah, Hamas, and the Global Jihad," Daniel Diker, ed., Jerusalem, Israel: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2007.

23. *Ibid*; and Daniel Benjamin, "The Nature of the Terrorist Threat," Statement delivered to the House Armed Services Committee, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, on February 14, 2007.

24. For instance, in a description of Islamism that identifies it as a totalitarian ideology committed to violence and seizure of power (thus excluding many varieties of Islamists), N. De Atkins begins his experiences with "terrorism" by describing the murder of Major Robert Perry in Amman by Palestinian "thugs," followed by terrorist actions of the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine. While he does note that his next meeting with terrorism was not with the "nationalist" variety but the Islamist sort, he has established Palestinian Arab terrorist groups in a terrorist lineage, and notably they are Arabs, not Irish, not Sri Lankan, not Chechnyan. He then concludes his essay by noting Ambassador Hume Horan's comment that there are no Arab "Christofer Dawsons . . . and Martin Bubers" . . . "politically engaged intellectuals who can help a young Arab make coherent responsible sense of a troubling modern world? They scarcely exist in the Arab world." Yet, this article did not concern Arabs, but supposedly addressed "Islamism" and Muslims. Norvell B. De Atkins, "Islam, Islamism and Terrorism," *Army*, January 2006, p. 56; readers should also see E. Badolato, "Learning to Think Like an Arab Muslim," *Naval War College Review*, March-April, 1984, www.blackwaterusa.com/betw/2004/articles/0503arabs.html; Timothy L. Tomas, "Al Qaeda and the Internet," *Parameters*, Spring 2003; Ralph Peters, "Rolling Back Radical Islam," *Parameters*, Autumn

2002; "Arab-Muslim Culture," *Security Solutions International*, www.homelandsecurityssi.com/ssi/content/view/186/150.

25. The "Telhami/Zogby Arab Public Opinion Survey of 2006" (Sixth year of a six country study) showed no improvement in the views of the United States: 57 percent disapproved, and 72 percent said the United States posed a greater threat to them than any other country or group. See also Pew Global Attitudes Project surveys dated October 25, 2007, August 8, 2007, March 14, 2007, and July 26, 2006; see also "Arab and Muslim Perception of the U.S.," October 11, 2005; "Pew Research Center for the People and the Press," May 22, 2007, March 21, 2005, and March 16, 2004; and "American Public Diplomacy in the Islamic World," delivered by Andrew Kohut to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, February 27, 2003. Also see Shibley Telhami, "Does Arab and Muslim Public Opinion Count?" January 24, 2005, Middle East Center, University of Utah.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *ABC News*, December 1, 2006; *Fox News*, January 4, 2007. See also "placing his hands on the Koran would have been a threat to our form of government." <http://www.speakingmymindonline.com>, December 1, 2007.

28. "U.S. Senate Opens with Hindu Prayers," *Daily News and Analysis*, Friday, July 13, 2007, www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1109672.

29. Communications by Sadeq al-Azm, Los Angeles, 1988.

30. Michael Hoebeck, "Muslim Reformers Intellectually Dishonest," *The Elephant Bar*, March 27, 2007, 2164th.blogspot.com/2007_03_01_archive.html.

31. Muhammad `Imara, *al-Islam wa-usul al-hukm li-`Ali `Abd al-Raziq* (Islam and the Foundation of Government of `Ali Abd al-Raziq), Beirut: al-Mu`assasat al-`Arabiyya lil-Dirasat w-al-Nashr, 1972, p. 92, and cited in translation and explained in Leonard Binder, *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, pp. 131, and see 128-169; also Ahmad Baha al-Din, *Ayyam laha tarikh* (Days with a History), Cairo: Dar al-Kitab

al-Arabi, 1954, pp. 213–240; and Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), 1962, pp. 184–192.

32. `Imara, pp. 170-171.

33. Binder, p. 144.

34. Said Amir Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 37; Ervand Abrahamian, "The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 10, 1979, pp. 381-414; Bast was even used by commanders like general Shehab al-Dawleh who appealed to Amineh Aqdas, the Qajar Shah's favorite wife, in order to get his regiment back when it was assigned to his cousin, Arjomand, p. 25.

35. For certain admiring (as well as critical) views of bin Ladin, see persons interviewed by Peter Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader*, New York: Free Press, 2006.

36. "Radical Islamist Ideologies and the Long War: Implications for U.S. Strategic Planning and U.S. Central Command's Operations," Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. (IFPA), January 2007, pp. 9-11.

37. Fawaz Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

38. Sherifa Zuhur, *A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of Counterinsurgency*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2005, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=636.

39. Usama's associates describe this charisma, not as a leader's attractiveness but that of a sincere believer and which later shifted to a more direct involvement in the movement. Bergen, *The Osama Bin Laden I Know*.

40. Marshall Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*. Vol. 2, *The Expansion of Islam in the Middle Periods*, Book Three, *The Establishment of an*

International Civilization, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977, pp. 12, 13.

41. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*. Vol. II, pp. 28, 33.

42. Previously posted at the www.tajdeed.org.uk website.

43. David Smock quoting Muqtadar Khan, "Islam and Democracy," Special Report No. 93, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, September 2002.

44. "Democratizing the Middle East?" Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies, Occasional Paper No. 2, 2006. A report on the conference entitled Democratizing the Middle East? held January 26-27, 2006, p. 5.

45. Khaled Abou El Fadl, "Islam and the Challenge of Democracy," *Boston Review*, April/May 2003.

46. Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939*, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 69-71.

47. Azzam S. Tamimi, "Democracy in Islamic Political Thought," Paper based on a lecture delivered at the Belfast Mosque, October 1997, www.e-prism.org/articlesbyotherscholars.html.

48. "Islam and democracy are not only compatible, their association is inevitable. In a Muslim society, one without the other is not perfect." Soroush, as quoted from interviews in Tehran, Iran, and Washington, DC, in 1994 and 1995; Robin Wright, "Islam and Liberal Democracy: Two Visions Of Reformation," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1996, pp. 64-75.

49. Many important views of democratization of the Middle East and the Muslim world have been written, but those coming in recent years from the West fail, in some instances, to account for democratic thinkers of the region. More importantly, Muslims can read imperialistic or Crusader intentions into some of these plans. Alon Ben-Meir, "Democracy of Convenience?" *Al-Bawaba*, November 8, 2005; Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce Downs, and George W. Downs, "Development and Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*,

September/October 2005; Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway, eds., *Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005; Larry Diamond, *Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq*, New York: Times Books, 2005; Gregory Gause III, "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?" *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2005; Steven R. Weisman, "Rice Urges Egyptians and Saudis to Democratize," *The New York Times*, June 21, 2005.

50. David Smock, "Islam and Democracy."

51. The survey was available on the Anwar Sadat Chair's web page, www.bsos.umd.edu/SADAT/.

52. Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque And Military*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005.

53. Mohamed El-Sayed, "In the Shadows," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, No. 779, February 1, 2006.

54. Martin Kramer, "Islam vs. Democracy," *Commentary*, January 1993, pp. 35-42.

55. Mona Yacoubian and Paul Stares, "Rethinking the War on Terror," United States Institute of Peace Briefing, p. 2, www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2005/0907. It is not a new approach at all, but one heard in the Reagan era and also voiced by some Arab and Muslim governments, i.e., this is not a truly Islamic movement, but a "sick" /diseased/insane/wrong-headed movement.

56. Peter L. Bergen and Swati Pandey, "The Madrassa Scapegoat," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 2, Spring 2006, pp. 117-125.

57. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "The Teaching of Philosophy," in Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Philosophy, Literature, and Fine Arts*, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: 1982, pp. 3-21.

58. Shahrough Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period*, Albany: State

University of New York, 1980; David Menashri, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992; Fanny Colonna, *Instituteurs Algeriens, 1883-1939* (Algerian Educators [but actually, educators in Algeria] 1883-1939) Paris: FNSP, 1975; Malika Zghal, *Gardiens de L'Islam: Les oulémas d'Al-Azhar dans l'Égypte contemporaine* (Guardians of Islam: The `Ulama of Al-Azhar in Contemporary Egypt) Paris: Presses de Sciences PO, 1996; or A. L. Tibawi, *Islamic Education: Its Traditions and Modernization into the Arab National Systems*, London: 1972.

59. J. Heyworth Dunne, *An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt*, London, England: 1968.

60. Tibawi, *Islamic Education*.

61. Munir D. Ahmad, "Muslim Education Prior to the Establishment of Madrasah," *Islamic Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 1987, pp. 321-348. Zahra Kamalkhani describes these circles in her dissertation, "Women's Islam: Religious Practice Among Women in Today's Iran," Bergen, Norway: Department of Social Anthropology, University of Bergen, 1996; or see S. Jeppie, *Language, Identity, Modernity: The Arabic Study Circle of Durban*, Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2007.

62. Abd al-Hamid AbuSulayman, ed., *Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Work Plan* (foreword by Isma'il al-Faruqi), Herndon, VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), 1989; Akbar S. Ahmad, *Toward Islamic Anthropology: Definition, Dogma, and Direction*, Lahore, Pakistan: Vanguard Books, 1987; Ahmad Shalaby, *History of Muslim Education*, Karachi, Pakistan: Indus Publications, 1979; Muhammad al-Qutb, *al-Tarbiyyah al-islamiyyah* (Curriculum of Islamic Education [tarbiyyah means education as training]), Vol. 2, *Fi al-tatbiq* (Application) Beirut: 1981.

63. Wadad Kadi and Victor Billeh, eds., *Islam and Education: Myths and Truths*, , Chicago: University of Chicago Press Journals, 2007.

64. International Crisis Group, "Pakistan: Madrasahs, Extremism, And The Military," *Asia Report* N°36, July 29, 2002.

65. C. Christine Fair, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Militancy-Madrasah Connection," *Asia Policy*, No. 4, July 2007, pp. 5-6.

66. Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, "The Madrassa Myth," *New York Times*, June 14, 2005.

67. David Kaplan, "Hearts, Minds, and Dollars: In an Unseen Front in the War on Terrorism, America is Spending Millions to Change the Very Face of Islam," *U.S. News and World Report*, April 17, 2005.

68. Salwa Al-Astawani, "Syria Enlists UNDP Help to Fight Extremism," *IslamOnline.net*, June 15, 2005.

69. Nezar AlSayyad and Manuel Castelis, eds., *Muslim Europe Or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization*, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002.

70. Giles Kepel, *Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997.

71. Clara Beyler, "The Jihadist Threat in France," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, Vol. 3, Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani, and Eric Brown, eds., Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2006.

72. Richard Youngs, *Europe and the Middle East: In the Shadow of September 11*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006. The overview from pp. 1-30 is useful, while the remainder of the book sets out European foreign policies towards specific Middle Eastern states or areas.

73. Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Bernard, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Peter Sickel, *Building Moderate Muslim Networks*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007, p. 93.

74. *Ibid.*, pp. 94-98.

75. Mahan Abedin, "An Interview with Dr. Kamal Helbawy," *Islamism Digest*, April 2007, p. 11; and personal interview with Helbawy, August 21, 2007.

76. For a good overview, see Jamie Chandler, "Cross National Surveys on Islamic Publics: Recent Studies," January 3, 2006, 64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:_HzfxFMSaSEJ:www.jamiechandler.com/PDFDocuments/islamic.pdf+world+values+survey+egypt+islamis+jamal&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us.

77. Moataz Fattah, *Democratic Values in the Muslim World*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.

78. Amaney Jamal, "Reassessing Support for Islam and Democracy in the Arab World?" Annual Meeting of the American Association of Political Scientists, September 2005.

79. Statement of Khaled Medhat Abou El Fadl to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States, December 8, 2003, www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing6/witness_elfadl.htm.

80. For example, the wife and daughter of General Ibrahim Izzat al-Douri, former vice-chair of Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council, were taken into custody on November 25, 2003, and U.S. forces destroyed a home owned by the family. (See letter by Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Watch, "Letter to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld," January 12, 2004, hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/12/usint6921_txt.htm, documenting the above seizures and home destructions in Tikrit, Samarra and Hawija.) Roth states: "As far as we are aware, they (the wife and daughter of General al-Douri) remain in U.S. custody. U.S. officials have provided no information as to the reason for taking these family members of a wanted person into custody. At the time they were detained, U.S. forces also destroyed a house belonging to the family." Two days after Human Rights Watch sent its protest letter to Rumsfeld, in a continuation of the same illegal policy, U.S. forces arrested four of al-Douri's nephews in pre-dawn raids in Samarra. They remain in custody. Also, farmers' crops were destroyed in October 2003 by bulldozers while soldiers played jazz music to punish villagers for not reporting on insurgents, *Independent*, October 12, 2003.

81. "Mistreatment of Detainees in Iraq," Open Letter to President Bush by Kenneth Roth, Human Rights Watch, May 18, 2004, www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/17/usint8591.htm; "The

New Iraq: Torture and Ill-Treatment of Detainees in Iraq," *hrw.org/reports/2005/iraq0105/*.

82. Juan Cole mentioned the French beheading of Egyptian "insurgents" in a presentation promoting his new book, *Napoleon's Egypt*. He compared Napoleon to President Bush, and spoke of the French invasion of Egypt and the American invasion of Iraq as "bookends" to the contemporary period. Washington DC: New America Foundation, August 24, 2007.

83. Jack L. Goldsmith and Neal Katyal, "The Terrorists' Court," *New York Times*, July 11, 2007.

84. Nazih Ayubi, "Islamic State," *Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, New York: Oxford, 1995, p. 320. For amplified discussion, see Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, London and New York: Routledge 1991.

85. The 31,000 person study by Fattah gives us some information, see *Democratic Values*.

86. Letter from Usama bin Ladin to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, August 3, 1995, appears in Roland Jacquard, *In the Name of Osama bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood*, Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 2002, p. 174.

87. See *www.muslim-refusenik.com/ijtihad.html*.

88. Gabriel Weimann, *Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006.

89. The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, "The Internet in the Arab World: A New Space of Repression," 2003-04 *www.hrinfor.net/en/reports/net2004/egypt.shtml*.

90. See *persianimpediment.org/sustainers/?p=8*.

91. Commencement Address, U.S. Coast Guard Academy, May 23, 2007, *www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html*.

92. "Kurds Feel Cheated," NPR, December 29, 2007, www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6697341.

93. Nora Boustany, (with Faiza Saleh Ambah), "Arab World Outraged Over Hangings in Iraq," *Washington Post Foreign Service*, January 18, 2007. Boustany reported various angry reactions to Saddam's execution, and that:

For the past 10 days, Beirut's *as-Safir* newspaper has run a poll of close to 15,000 respondents: 19 percent said the execution of Hussein was just, but the timing was wrong; 19 percent said the execution was unjust because it was carried out under U.S. occupation; and 36 percent said it was deficient because Hussein was not tried for all the crimes committed by his regime. About 25 percent said the execution was mishandled and would create more civil strife.

94. Greg Lubold, "Do U.S. Prisons in Iraq Breed Insurgents?" *Christian Science Monitor*, December 20, 2007.

95. When I wrote this monograph, Norman Podhoretz' *World War IV: The Long Struggle Against Islamofascism*, New York: Doubleday, 2007, had not yet been published. It has only convinced me that demonization, and longing for a state of war, is not an appropriate foreign policy for America.

96. Ralph Peters, "Islam-Haters: An Enemy Within," *New York Post*, September 7, 2006.

97. The term seems to have been borrowed by Eikmeier from a memo circulated by William McCants of the U.S. Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center. Dale C. Eikmeier, "Qutbism: An Ideology of Islamic-Fascism," *Parameters*, Spring 2007, pp. 85-98.

98. *Ibid.*

99. Abdurrahman Wahid, "Right Islam vs. Wrong Islam," in Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani, and Eric Brown, eds., *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, Vol. 3, Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2006, pp. 5-9,6.

100. Muhammad ibn al-Hasan Shaybani, *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar*, Majid Khadduri, trans., Baltimore, MD: 1966.

101. `Abd al-Rahman al-Awza'i, *Sunan*, (The sunna is the habitual practice of the Prophet Muhammad) Beirut: 1993; and Abu Yusuf (Yaqub ibn Ibrahim al-Ansari, al-Radd), *`Ala siyar al-Awza'i (The Refutation of al-Awza'i's Law of War)*, Cairo: 1357h. `Abd al-Rahman ibn `Amr al-Awza'i was a scholar heading a *madhhab*, or school of Islamic law. His approach to jihad was probably influenced by the wars with the Byzantine Empire in his era, and dealt with the issue of jihad "of the borders."

102. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein and Sherifa Zuhur, *Islamic Rulings on Warfare*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=588.

103. Some radical fatwas are described in Shmuel Bar, "Jihad Ideology in Light of Contemporary Fatwas," *Hudson Institute Research Monographs on the Muslim World*, Series No. 1, Paper No. 1, August 15, 2006. But one should refer to contrasting fatwas, including some of those listed at www.unc.edu/~kurzman/terror.htm.

104. One of Tariq Ramadan's main themes. See his book, *In the Footsteps of the Prophet: Lessons from the Life of Muhammad*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

105. Abdullah al-Askar, "Muslims Speak Out," *Washingtonpost.com*, newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/muslims_speak_out/2007/07/abdullah_alaskar.html.

106. Mahmoud Ayoub, "The Islamic Concept of Justice," in Nimat Hafez Barazangi, M. Raquibuz Zaman and Omar Afzal, eds., *Islamic Identity and the Struggle for Justice*, Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1996, pp. 19-20.

107. See description and Letter to Congress, www.letter2congress.blogspot.com/. The members of the Jihad Awareness Project sent Congressmen and Senators copies of Robert Spencer, *Religion of Peace? Why Christianity Is and Islam Isn't*, and a DVD entitled *Islam: What the West Needs to Know*.

108. Sherifa Zuhur, *Iran, Iraq, and the United States: The New Triangle's Impact on Sectarianism and the Nuclear Threat*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006; p. 28.

109. Ali Shariati, "*Jihad and Shahadat*," translation available at www.al-islam.org/beliefs/philosophy/shahadat.html.

110. Ali Shariati, "*Fatima is Fatima*," translation available at Iran Chamber Society, www.iranchamber.com/personalities/ashariati/works/fatima_is_fatima1.php.

111. For example, the following report which compiles different facts and inaccuracies about the Kharijites, martyrdom operations (which did not begin in Lebanon, but rather in Sri Lanka), and *takfir*: Sammy Salam and Kathleen Thompson, "*The Historical Roots of Current Terrorist Tactics and Methods*," posted at the Washington, DC: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 21, 2003, cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/031121.htm.

112. As in this community source taken from *Al-Da`wah ila Allah* in *Ar-Risaalat-un-Naafi`ah*, (transliteration as printed) Vol. IV, No. 4, May 2007.

113. For example, the *majles.com* website castigates Dr. Amina Wudud as the "*American Dajjal* of *Kufr*." See books.themajlis.net/node/388; or see discussion at www.sunniforum.com/forum/showthread.php?t=3980&page=8.

114. Governmental figures, think tanks, and defense and terrorism specialists offer various types of negative or misleading statements about Islamic law. For instance, an Iraq governed by Islamic law is frequently described as a negative end-state, or a "*theocracy*" as in Patrick Leahey's "*Statement on the War in Iraq*," October 25, 2005; Rausch defines America's War on "*jihadism*" and defines "*jihadism*" up front as using force to expand the "*rule of Islamic law*" (implicitly an evil). *National Journal*, *Atlantic.com*, April 18, 2006, www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200604u/nj_rauch_2006-04-18; Robert Scheer, "*The Law of Unintended Consequences*," *The Nation*, February 21, 2005; RAND authors also describe "*states governed by Islamic law*" as the end-goal of the radicals, *www*.

rand.org/news/press.07/03.26.html. Cheryl Bernard goes further to argue that the United States should choose primarily to empower “modernist” Muslims, never “fundamentalists,” and “traditionalists” (who quite unanimously support Islamic law) only selectively; those of the Hanafi school of law, but not the Wahhabi/Hanbali tradition. See Cheryl Bernard, “Five Pillars of Democracy: How the West Can Promote An Islamic Reformation,” www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/spring2004/pillars.html, Spring 2004. The 9/11 Commission incompletely defines the *shari`ah* as “a code of law derived from the *Qur`an* and *hadith*” (not mentioning the other sources of *shari`ah*) and also does not mention that Muslims strive to live according to the *shari`ah*, but instead that “For many Muslims, a good government would be one guided by the moral principles of their faith. This does not necessarily translate into a desire for clerical rule and the abolition of a secular state. It does mean that some Muslims tend to be uncomfortable with the separation between church and state. . . . To extremists, however, such divisions, as well as the existence of parliaments and legislation, only prove these rulers to be false Muslims usurping God’s authority over all aspects of life.” This implies that all those who oppose parliaments and non-*shari`ah* legislation are extremists and that “most” Muslims do not fall into this category. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Section 2, 2004, www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch2.htm.

115. “Our enemies are a few thousand lunatics who want to put the entire world in a strait-jacket of 12th century Islamic law who shouldn’t be hard to defeat in a public relations war. If our situation wasn’t so tragic and dire, it would be hysterically funny. If it were a movie, it would be called ‘The Jihadi Mouse that Roared’.” Statement by Congressman Gary Ackerman in Support of Legislation to Implement the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, January 9, 2007.

116. *CBC News*, September 11, 2005.

117. June Starr, *Law as Metaphor: From Islamic Courts to the Palace of Justice*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992.

118. As in the skit by Muhammad Zain al-Awdi, “The Courts Before the Correction Movement,” included in Brinkley Messick,

The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society, Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1993, pp. 208-210.

119. Tariq Ramadan, "For a Moratorium on the Application of Sharia in the Muslim World," *Le Monde*, April 4, 2005.

120. Timothy R. Furnish, "Conclusion: Who Will Be the Next Mahdi," in Furnish, *Holiest Wars, Islamic Mahdis, Their Jihads and Osama bin Laden*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005.

121. Ayoub, "The Islamic Concept of Justice," p. 25.

122. Peter Malcolm (P. M.) Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan; 1881-1898*, 2nd Ed., Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1970.

123. James Buchan, "The Return of the Ikhwan-1979," in David Holden and Richard Johns, eds., *The House of Saud: The Rise and Fall of the Most Powerful Dynasty in the Arab World*, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981, p. 512. Many accounts of the event were also published in Arabic, some by surviving hostages.

124. Joseph Kechichian, "The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 18, 1986, pp. 60-62.

125. Scott Peterson, "Waiting for the Rapture in Iran," *Christian Science Monitor*, December 21, 2005.

126. Sherifa Zuhur, "Orgoglio Iranio" (*Iranian Pride*) in "Enigma Iraniano," (*Iranian Enigma*), *Intelligence: Strategie per la sicurezza*, No. 3, September 2006.

127. Ali Shariati, "Intizar: The Religion of Protest and the Return to Self," in John Donohue and John Esposito, eds., *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 298-304; and *idem*, *On the Sociology of Islam*, Hamid Algar, trans. Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1979, p. 124.

128. "Mufti `amm al-Sa`udiyya li-l-Sharq al-awsat: Khatf al-ta'irat wa tarwi` al-aminin muharam sha'an," (*Saudi Grand Mufti [speaks] to Sharq al-Awsat*) *Al-Sharq al-awsat*, April 21, 2001; and for discussion

of the Egyptian reaction to the *fatwa*, see Dyala Hamzah, "Is There an Arab Public Sphere? The Palestinian Intifada, a Saudi Fatwa and the Egyptian Press," in Armando Salvatore and Mark LeVine, eds., *Religion, Social Practice, and Contested Hegemonies*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. I agree with Hamzah that the popular ideas on jihad are not free of nationalism, but not that the Arab public sphere does not exist, rather, it is not unified.

129. Azzam Tamimi, *Hamas: A History from Within*, Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2007, p. 161.

130. Jacquelyn Davis (principal investigator) and IIPA, "Radical Islamic Ideologies and Implications for U.S. Strategic Planning and U.S. Central Command's Operations," Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, January 2007, p. 4.

131. CNN, January 22, 2007.

132. Daniel Pipes, "Identifying Moderate Muslims," November 23, 2004, www.danielpipes.org/article/2226.

133. David Horowitz, *The Professors: The 101 Most Dangerous Academics in America*, Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2006. The author's other targets of this book are Afrocentric black intellectuals and gays.

134. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Jane I. Smith, eds., *Muslim Communities in North America*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994.

135. *International Herald Tribune*, October 15, 2001, www.ihf.com/articles/2001/10/15/rislam_ed3.php.

136. See news.findlaw.com/prnewswire/20071009/09oct20071707.html.

137. *New York Times*, May 4, 2007; closure in Fairfax, VA, *Washington Times*, July 2, 2004; regarding recommended closure, see *Washington Post*, November 4, 2007; mosques face opposition through zoning disputes and indictment of their imams. Islamic schools have been closed recently in England, Scotland, and Australia, where the main charge is teaching religion "too much"

(43 percent of the curriculum) and, secondarily, fraud and foreign transfer of funds, *newscom.au*, December 10, 2007.

138. Bill Ong Hing, *Misusing Immigration Policies in the Name of Homeland Security* CR: *The New Centennial Review*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 195-224; Louise Cainkar, "Post 9/11 Domestic Policies Affecting U. S. Arabs and Muslims: A Brief Review," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2004, pp. 245-248.

139. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, August 7-13, 2003, weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/650/in2.htm; and as in Jihad al-Khazen's commentary, *al-Hayat*, October 31, 2007.

140. Asma Gull Hasan, *American Muslims: The New Generation*, New York: Continuum, 2002; Jane I. Smith, *Islam in America*, New York: Columbia Press, 1999.

141. M. A. Kettani, *Muslim Minorities in the World Today*, London: Mansell, 1986; see Yvonne Haddad and John Esposito, "The Dynamics of Islamic Identity in North America," *Muslims on the Americanization Path*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, arabowrld.nitle.org/texts.php?module_id=71&print=1, p. 8.

142. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, "American Foreign Policy in the Middle East and its Impact on the Identity of Arab Muslims in the United States," in Ernest J. Wilson, ed., *Diversity and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Reader*, New York: Routledge, 2004.

143. Amaney Jamal, "The Political Participation and Engagement of Muslim Americans: Mosque Involvement and Group Consciousness," *American Politics Research*, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2005. pp. 521-544.

144. "Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream," Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, May 21, 2007, people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=329; Katherine Parker, "Peering Through a Glass Half-full, Darkly," *Townhall.com*, May 25, 2007, www.townhall.com/columnists/KathleenParker/2007/05/25/peering_through_a_glass_half_full,_darkly.

145. An actual map is proposed in Ralph Peters, "Blood Borders: How a New Middle East Would Look," *Armed Forces Journal*, June 2006.

146. For a harsh critique of Rice's statements, see Sidney Blumenthal, "The Neo-con Resurgence," *The Guardian*, July 27, 2006.

147. Curriculum and published studies are affected. Examples in military institute curricula are the frequent use of Raphael Patai, *The Arab Mind*, and Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong*. Several studies have already been critiqued in this article; both Michael Scott Doran's and Dale Eikemeir's articles are examples of neo-Orientalism, but there are many others which build on an Orientalist approach as in Ralph Peters, "When Muslim Armies Won," *Armed Forces Journal*, August 2007.

148. Fatemeh Keshavarz, "Banishing the Ghosts of Iran," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, July 13, 2007, chronicle.com/weekly/v53/i45/45b00601.htm.

149. Media scholars explain that journalists "frame" and set agendas, and that framing can involve bias. One content analysis study shows that Palestinians were more frequently covered with the use of the words terrorist, terrorism, or terror following the 9/11 attacks. May Farah, "'Terror'tories: 9/11, Media Discourse, and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict," Paper presented to the Middle East Studies Association 39th Annual Meeting, Washington DC, November 19-22, 2005.

150. François Legrain, "A Defining Moment: Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism," in James Piscatori, ed., *Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis*, Chicago: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991; *idem*, *Les Palestines du quotidien: Les élections de l'autonomie Janvier 1996 (The Everyday Palestines: The Autonomy Elections January 1996)*, Beirut, Lebanon: CERMOC, 1999.

151. " Hamas May Be a Partner," *Ynet.Com*, January 22, 2007. See also Yoram Schweitzer and Amir Kulick, "At the End of the Day, Hamas Too," *Strategic Assessment*, Vol. 10, No. 2, August 2007; and Uri Avnery's advertisement in *Haaretz* that coincided with the Annapolis meeting on November 27, 2007.

152. Moshe Terdman and Sherifa Zuhur, "*al-Haram al-Sharif*," ("Temple Mount"), *Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, forthcoming, 2008.

153. "The Jerusalem Powder Keg," *Middle East Report* No. 44, Washington, DC, and New York: International Crisis Group, August 2, 2005.

154. Philip Mattar, *The Mufti of Jerusalem: al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

155. Ziad Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalisms in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994.

156. Sherifa Zuhur, "Islamic Movement in Israel," in Spencer Tucker, ed., *Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, forthcoming 2008; also see Issam Aburaiya, "The 1996 Split of the Islamic Movement in Israel: Between the Holy Text and Israeli-Palestinian Context," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, Vol. 17, No. 3, March 2004, pp. 439-455.

157. Tom Segev, "What if Israel Had Turned Back?" *New York Times*, June 5, 2007; Letter to the Editor from Hana El Sahly, *New York Times*, June 6, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/06/06/opinion/106mideast.html?ei=5124&en=fd0411eb791c2553&ex=1338868800&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink&pagewanted=all.

158. See www.islamfortoday.com/qaradawi02.htm.

159. John Burns, "Osama Stirs Struggle on Meaning of Jihad," *New York Times*, January 27, 2002, www.sullivan-county.com/identity/bin_laden.html.

160. For example, Thomas Friedman wrote, "To this day – to this day – no major Muslim cleric or religious body has ever issued a fatwa condemning Osama bin Laden," *New York Times*, July 8, 2005. This is false. At virtually every public event or class where "Islam" occurs in the title of my address since 2004, one student or audience member will assert that no clerics have denounced terrorism.

161. Patrick Gaffney, *The Prophet's Pulpit: Islamic Preaching in Contemporary Egypt*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994.

162. As in Cheryl Bernard's approach, although she notes there can be overlap.

163. Richard Antoun, "Muslim Preacher in the Modern World: A Jordanian Case Study," Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.

164. Lindsay Wise, "Amr Khaled vs. Yusuf Al Qaradawi: The Danish Cartoon Controversy and the Clash of Two Islamic TV Titans," TBS 2006, www.tbsjournal.com/Wise.htm.

165. Nashwa Abdel-Tawab, "TV Preachers in Egypt: Religion Anyone?" *Al-Ahram Weekly* posted at Qantara, www.qantara.de.

166. Patrick Haenni and Husam Tammam, "Egypt's Air-Conditioned Islam," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September 2003.

167. Letter from Joe Glover, Family Policy Network inviting signatories on a petition, www.conservativepetitions.com/petitions.php?id=86#tag_body?PID=73c3b3ca672d23c2028bb407c38d96f2.

168. S. Abid Husain, *The Destiny of Indian Muslims*, New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965, p. 170.

169. Fauzi Najjar, "The Arabs, Islam, and Secularization," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XII, No. 3, Fall 2005, p. 94.

170. Olivier Roy, *Secularism Confronts Islam*, George Holoch, trans., New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

171. Sherifa Zuhur, "Egyptian Eagle and Syrian Phoenix: Islamism in Comparative Perspective," Middle East Studies Association, Research Triangle, NC, November 1993.

172. Najjar, pp. 94, 95.

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the issue of mixed populations in the center of the country. See biden.senate.gov/newsroom/details.cfm?id=263407&&.

174. *Washington Post*, September 28, 2007.

175. Martin Kramer, "The Oracle of Hizbullah: Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah," Part 2, www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/Oracle2.htm#n124.

176. Michael Scott Doran, "The Saudi Paradox," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2004, pp. 35-51; and my comments in Sherifa Zuhur, *Saudi Arabia: Islamic Threat, Political Reform, and the Global War on Terror*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005, p. 17.

177. Davis, "Radical Islamist Ideologies and the Long War," and "Islamist Strategic Framework for the Long War."

178. Neil Lewis, "Fresh Details Emerge on Harsh Methods at Guantanamo," *New York Times*, January 1, 2005; Mark Tran, "FBI Files Detail Guantanamo Torture Tactics," *Guardian*, January 3, 2007.

179. "CIA Director: Agency Taped Terror Interrogations," Fox News and *Associated Press*, December 10, 2007; and Editorial, *Mercury News*, December 10, 2007.

180. This idea has been suggested by Muslim thinkers as well. With regard to rethinking the status of women in Islam, this is probably an important endeavor. See Khaled Abou El Fadl, *Speaking in God's Name: Islamic Law, Authority, and Women*, Oxford, England: Oneworld Publications, 2001.

181. Abou El Fadl, "Islam and the Challenge of Democracy."

182. Hamzah, "Is There an Arab Public Sphere?"

183. Davis, "Radical Islamist Ideologies."

184. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* 1762, London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1973, p. 279.

185. "Proud to be French and Muslim, we defend the republic, liberties and *laïcité*"; "Neither fathers, nor our husbands, we chose the headscarf"; and "Neither forced nor downtrodden," were the cries of demonstrators. Aref Abu-Rabia, "The Veil and Muslim Women in France," *Anthropology of the Middle East*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 2006, pp. 100, 101.

186. See www.muhababah.com/niqab-index.htm.

187. *New York Times Week in Review*, October 22, 2006.

188. *New York Times*, June 22, 2007.

189. Jennifer Heath, ed., *The Veil*, Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming 2008.

190. In a 2004 Cornell University study ("Restrictions on Civil Liberties, Views of Islam, and Muslim Americans, U.S. War on Terror, U.S. foreign Policy, and Anti-Americanism"), a high proportion of Americans believed that Islam encourages violence—65 percent of highly religious respondents and 42 percent who did not describe themselves as "very religious." Almost half the respondents wanted Muslim-Americans' civil liberties to be restricted. See www.news.cornell.edu/releases/Dec04/Muslim.Poll.bpf.html.

191. "Islam's Violent Core," www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=39116.

192. Edward Said, *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How we See the Rest of the World*, New York: Pantheon, 1981; New York: Vintage, 1997.

193. On "The 700 Club," in 1995.

194. Hannity and Colmes, September 19, 2002.

195. *Daily Times* (Pakistan), November 5, 2006.

196. Karen Armstrong, Address to the Clark Center, Dickinson College, Carlisle, PA, 2005.

197. Sarah Zabel, *The Military Strategy of Global Jihad*, Strategic Research Project and Carlisle Paper, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007, p. 11.

198. Naveed Sheikh, *The New Politics of Islam: Pan-Islamic Foreign Policy in a World of States*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.

199. *Al-Ikhbariyah*, April 27, 2007; Christopher Boucek, "Extremist Reeducation and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia," *Saudi-US Relations Information Service*, posted at Saudi Debate, August 2007.

200. Sherifa Zuhur, *Gender, Sexuality, and Criminal Laws in the Middle East and the Islamic World*, Istanbul, Turkey: WWHR/New Ways, 2005.

201. Lamia AbuOdeh, "Crimes of Honour and the Construction of Gender in Arab Societies," in Mai Yamani, ed., *Feminism and Islam: Legal and Literary Perspectives*, Reading, Berkshire, England: Ithaca Press and Centre for Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, University of London, 1996.

202. Islah Jad, "Citizenship under a Prolonged Occupation," in Sherifa Zuhur, ed., *Women and Gender in the Middle East and the Muslim World Today*, Berkeley: UCIS and University of California Press, 2003, and in press for print publication.

203. Rabasa et al., *Building Moderate Muslim Networks*, p. 143.